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3. 
A BRIEF. 
The general purposes of this thesis are:-
(1) To present in a clear and concise manner an analysis 
of the problem of causality. 
(2) To examine the relative rank of importance accorded 
it by the representatives of the rationalisi\c and sensation-
alistic schools of the eighteenth century. 
(3) To set forth Kant's analysis of the problem of causal-
ity and criticise certain of his conclusions. 
(4) To iilustrate, in the light of such a study, the impli-
cations of various philosophical principles. 
The Problem of Causality. 
(1) This problem is important, because practically all 
philosophical problems have their origin in it. 
(2) No problem is more fundamental, because causality con-
stitutes the very warp and woof of experience. 
(3) It is very much feared because of its complexity and 
obscurity. 
(4) The difficulties and elusiveness of the problem 
should spur men to greater and better effort to effect its 
solution • 
(5) No one can deny the existence of causality. 
(6) While no difficulty presents itself when causality 
is posited, disagreement comes when an attempt is made to 
locate and define it. 
•.. 
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4. 
An Analysis. 
(1) Some philosophers contend that it is impossible to give 
an independent statement of the problem of causality. 
(2) We do not deny the importance of the history of a question, 
but believe there are times when history, at least in part, 
may be ignored. Therefore, we give an independent statement 
of the problem. 
(3) Aristotle was the first philosopher to devote much attention 
to causality. His contribution to the subject consisted rather 
in a classification of the various types of causes, than in 
a discussion of its problems. 
(4) For the purpose of this thesis, it is not necessary to 
take into account material, formal and final causes, since 
their problem is so clearly interwoven with that of efficient 
causes, whose investigation is our object. 
(5) It is desirable to distinguish between final and efficient 
causes, for the two are easily misunderstood and therefore it 
is easy to make a false application of them. 
(6) So also, we must perceive the difference between cause 
as an agent or force, and the concept of cause itself. J\'.ore-
over, it is necessary to have a clear understanding of the 
meaning of cause and effect and their relation. 
(?) All philosophical theories fall into two great classes: 
theories of knowledge , and theories of being • 
(8) The problem of causality belongs to both of these 
5. 
divisions. It has two sides)an epistemological and a metaphys-
ical. 
Epistemological Implications. 
(1) Epistemology suggests three questions: (a) What is the 
source of the concept of causality? (b) \Vhat validity has it? 
and (c) What is the form of its application? 
(2) Some philosophers hold that external objects give us 
the idea of causality; others, that it is a law of the under-
standing. 
(3) As to the validity of the idea, conflicting views exist. 
Certain schools contend that it has application only in the 
phenomenal world; others, that its complement exists in reality. 
(4) The third point; namely, the form of the application 
of the principle of causation forms the crux of the episte-
mological problem. 
(5) Philosophers agree that a causal ground must be affirmed, 
but they are not agreed as to the location of that ground; 
neither are they able, unanimously, to fix the form under 
which it must be conceived. 
Ontological Problems. 
-----~----------~------~ 
(1) Ontologically considered, we study causality in the 
sense of productive activit~ and efficiency. 
(2) The following questions present themselves: Can anything 
be knawn concerning the first cause? If so, what is the 
nature of this knowledge? 
(3) In the universe we find physical and psychical forces. 
• 
6. 
What is the relation of these two froms of reality? Does real-
;.,; O.f p '-"'4:._ 
L·" \ : ( '· 
ity consist of two entirelyAkinds of existence? Or can the 
two forms , the physical and the psychical, be reduced to 
one? 
(4) Dualism, materialism and spiritualism have made various 
answers. 
Importance of Kant's Analysis. 
---------------------------------
(1) Kant's analysis is important, because it is the resul-
tant of two great philosophical movements. 
(2) It initiated a new era in philosophy and forms the 
starting-point of much, if not all, worth-while philosopl1ic 
effort since his time. 
(3) It has found acceptance with many philosophers! 
(4) The postulates of reason have been made the basis of 
this analysis. 
Development of the Principle of 
Causality by Kant's Predecessors. 
-----------------------------------------
(1) In order that Kant's analysis of the problem of cau-
sality may be understood, it is desirable to examine the factors 
and forces which in a great measu.re gave shape to it • 
(2) These forces cannot be traced back to the very beginning 
of philosophy, as may be seen by an examination of the specula-
tions of the first philosophers. 
7. 
(3) Thales, Pa~enides, Heraclitus, Plato and Aristotle were 
satisfied with an attempt to find for the "many" a unity, and 
were content to assume causes without seeking to analyze their 
nature. They did not touch upon the real problem of causality. 
Rationalistic Systems. 
(1) It ·is not until the time of nescartes and his contem-
poraries, that the modern idea of cause and substance took 
definite form and root. ~escartes, in contrast to the Grecian 
philosophers , turned away from obej~tive knowledge to self 
as a clew to the interpretation of reality. Thereby, he made 
possible the modern conception of cause and substance. 
Descartes considered that the world was made up of ideas 
and quantum, and posited God as the agent making possible ari 
interaction between the two. 
(2) Ualebranche and G~ulincx agreed with Descartes that the 
world was composed of ideas and quantum , but found difficulty 
in understanding the causal .process from one of these factors 
to the other. Their problem was psycho- physical. Although 
differj(ing in their methods, both posited God as the true ground 
for the causal connection. The human will does not institute 
a relation between stimuli and sensation~and between purposes 
and bodily movements. On occasion of the action of this agent 
God intervenes, and cl~nges the direction of the body to 
secure the desired result. 
r -- ~ 8. 
(3} Spinoza , following the Occasionalists, makes God not only 
the sole cause, but also the sole effect.In a word, God is the 
world and the world is God. He constitutes both the world of 
ideas, and the wo:J;ld of matter. Therefore , a connection between 
the two is easily imagined. In fact,there has been no separation 
at all. 
(4} Leibnitz posits "force" as the essence of the first cause. 
This force is creative, and has its existence in entities which 
he designates , Monads. God is the central monad, and th~ ground 
and cause of all existing monads, whose number is infinite. 
Leibnitz laid the basis for a better understanding of the 
problem of causality, b~ insisting upon an identity of the part 
with the whole, and elaborating a system in which unity is 
found in plurality. 
{5} Christian Wolff regarded logical necessity ::as .identical :.with 
reality, and held that by means of mere logical operations 
with conceptions, it was possible to determine the causal rela-
tions of things. He placed at the head of his ontology the prin-
ciple of contradiction and that of sufficient reason, and sought 
to substantiate the latter through proof. He found an indirect 
proof of the existence of the principle of sufficient reason 
in the order and interaction of things, since they demanded 
principles according to which each individual is determined 
in its place. Wolff's doctrine is of especial interest because 
Kant at first adopted it, and then as the "Great Kant" reacted 
against it. 
9. 
The Sensationalists. 
_____ .... --------- ---. ..., • : • r: -.--
(1) John Locke, the first representative of the sensation-
alists, thought that we receive our ideas of cause and effect 
through an obeservation of nature. Anything which produces a 
simple or complex idea, we denote by the general name, cause; 
and that which is produced, effect. The notion of cause itself, 
hoe its rise from ido~s r~ceived by sen~ation or reflection. 
Leibnitz failed to reach the essence of the problem of 
causality; namely, what is the principle by which the two ele-
menta of causal relation cause and effect, are connected. 
{2) Berkeley agreed with Locke, that all knowledge comes 
from experience. He denied,however, that material substance 
exists. We see only appearances, not the real quality of things. 
Through the laws of nature we are led to the idea of cause and 
effect. Eack of these laws and back of the ideas to which they 
give rise is God, who is an active incorporeal spirit. 
Berkeley's significance lies in the fact that he makes 
spirit the essence and cause of the universe, and the Deity 
the source of our sensible impressions. He was the first to 
formulate clearly the doctrine of phenomenalism. 
{3) Hume's most important contribution to philosophy is his 
speculation concerning causality. Causality, he declares, con-
tains three essential elements: contiguity, succession, and 
necessary connection. Of the first two of these elements 
we can predicate the origin but no impression can be found 
10. 
for the third. Whence then the idea? Hume reasons as follows: 
(a) The senses cannot give us such information for they are 
limited to the present moment;(b) Neither can reasoning upon 
experience aid us; (c) From these facts it logically follows, 
that the principle must come from the only remaining faculty, 
the imagination. 
The Reaction. 
----------------
(1) In opposition to the rationalists Kant declares that a 
real or fundamental causality is never logical; and therefore, 
it is impossible to determine out of pure reason, that is, 
through logical conceptions, anything concerning the relatio~ 
of cause and effect. 
(2) Awakened from his dogmatic slumber by Hume's reasoning, 
Kant saw that the principle of causality could not be derived 
from experience. Nevertheless, he decided , it must be more 
than a mere figment of the imagination. He concluded , that 
the only way to establish truth and philosophy on a firm basis, 
was to undertake a profound investigation of the laws of the 
understanding itself, to ascertain the origin and the validity 
of the idea. The result was the Critique of Pure Reason, which 
seeks to determine the origin, the number, and the legitimate 
province of the ideas or forms of thought not derived from 
experience; such as substance, causality, space, time etc. 
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Kant's Problems. 
-----------~-~--------
(1) The rationalists contended that the concepts of cause, 
space, and time, had absolute objective validity. Hume asserted 
that they were products of the imagination. 
(2) Kant decided that the contradictory statements of his 
predecessors wer e due to the fact that they had assumed that 
reason possessed certain characteristics, but had failed to 
examine whether these assumptions were true. 
(3) Therefore , he made it the aim of his investigations 
to determine whether a priori knowledge, such as space, time , 
and causality exists~ If so, what is its value? Has it objective 
validity? How is such knowledge possible? Upon what does it 
rest and what is its nature? 
Kant's Analysis. 
(1) A priori knowledge is knowledge which transcends all 
experience, and is not capable of being proved by any experience. 
It presents us with general truths which bear the character of 
an inward necessity and are clear and certain by themselves. 
Absolute necessity and strict universality are its character-
istics. 
(2) A priori judgments exist as principles in the theoretical 
sciences: mathematics, the pure natural sciences, and meta-
physics. Kant's criticismproceeds from the actual presence 
of these judgments. 
12. 
(3) The general ideas of s pace and time to which all in-
sight into geometry and arithmetic relate, are principles of 
pure a priori knowledge • .Each of them has strict universality 
and absolute necessity as its characteristics. External exper-
A.. ience does not give rise to thse concepts, but space and time 
J\ 
intuitions make external experience possible. 
In criticism of this position we point out that the 
forms, s pace and time, although subjective in origin are mod-
ified by external representations. 
(4) Causality is also an a priori principle, but while space 
and time are pure a priori forma, causality is such only in part. 
Before we can have an idea of a particular causal relation an 
objective presentation is necessary. But while the understanding 
receives its knowledge of particular effects from experience, 
the causal law itself, is a pure a priori principle, inherent 
in the mind. Its formula is: Every phenomenon presupposes 
something upon which it follows according to rule. 
(5) The a priori principles space, time, and causality 
are synthetical cognitions. They are they product of the syn-
thetic action of the understanding. This action makes experience 
possible. It arranges different representations and compre-
hends what is manifold in them under one form of know1edge. 
(6) A priori principles have validity only in the phenom-
enal world. The very natu:re of the understanding makes it neces-
sary that the sensory material which forms its data be passed 
pes • 
I 13. 
through a process of transmutation before it can become a 
form of cognition. This process causes the real nature of things 
to be hidden from us. This doctrire is known as phenomenalism. 
In criticism of this theory. , we point out among other 
thinge:(a) The impossibility of affirming that a noumenal 
world lies beyond the sphere of cognition; (b) That appear-
. 
ances to be such must mediate knowledge of some sort;(c) That 
any attempt to conceive substance without properties comes 
face to face with all the arguments valid against pure being. 
;(7) Experience is never able to give us an unconditioned 
cause. Reason/however, aims at systematical completeness and 
unity; a unity greater than any to which empirical knowledge 
can attain. It does this through mental representatio~which 
Kant calls Ideas. Ideas are regulative principles by which the 
understanding is constrai.ned to seek for farther and farther 
connecting links in the realm of experience. They demonstrate 
nothing and can prove nothing objectively.- Consequently,all 
the attempts of pure reason to prove the existence of God,etc. 
are futile. 
(8) The arguments for the existence of God drawn from 
specu~tive reason are worthless. These proofs are three, the 
physico-theological, the cosmological, and the ontological. 
The ont.ological argument concludes from the Idea of God,; 
the existence of a supreme being. Kant shows that such an ar-
14. 
gument has no more value than the following reasoning of a poor 
man: I have the icfea. of a hundr ed thalers, therefore a hundred 
thalers exist - in my purse. The cosmological argument reads 
as follows: If it is possible for things to exist, then a nec-
essary being must exist as their cause. Reason has no:· proof 
for this supposition. It cannot bridge the chasm existing be-
tween the world as a created thing, and the first cause as a 
creator. The physico- theological proof is worthless because it 
rests upon the ontological and cosmological proofs~and there-
fore is subject to the criticisms valid against them~ 
( 9) To substantiate his contention further-' that all arguments J;~ 
from pure reason and metaphysics to prove the personality and 
the existence of God, are futile and worthless; Kant shows that 
the opposite can with equal facility be proved from the same 
source. ThusJantinomies arise which are inexplicable. 
We point out that these antinomies are the logical out-
come of Kant's theory~that the universe is composed of a known 
world of appearances and an unknown noumenal world. 
(10) Practical reason furnishes a certain ground for the 
existence of God, the soul, and immortality. We find within 
us an absolute moral law, imperative and commanding - the au-
thority of conscience. This law implies a future state, a soul, 
and a God who is its author. 
15. 
(1) In recapitulation we summarize Kant's problems and 
his analysis of them. 
(2) His main problem was cau$ality. In order to lay a 
sound basis for its analysis Kant examines a number of allied 
philosophical principles. 
(3) Causality, space, and time are a priori forma. He exam-
' 
ines their validity and orign. 
1'-
(4~ These forms axe principles of the understanding and 
therefore have application in the phenomenal world only, whose 
framework they constitute. 
(5) The world of appearances must conform to certain rigid 
laws, such as causation, etc. These laws are not laws of the 
noumenal world. They hold for the show-world of experience only. 
(6} The moral law within us, attested to by consciousness, 
makes practically certain the existence of the soul, immortality, 
and a God who is its author. 
• 
16. 
THE PROBLEM OF CAUSAI .. ITY. 
That causality of some sort exists no one can deny. To 
prove its existence it is only necessary to call attention 
to the disaster involved if we deny the causal element. 
Thinga~ if real, would be mutually indifferent and non-
existent. Such a thing as orderly experience would be impos-
aible; all would be chaos, for events would be groundless. 
·solipsism would result, if perception could be said to be poe-
sible; for our ovm perceptions· having no cause could never 
be related to a real world. In fact, the idea of being itself, 
as anything beyond the individual and momentary representation 
,) 
would vanish and nihilism would reign. In fact, we can hardly 
imagine a state of affairs where causality would be lacking. 
Therefore, no difficulty is found when causality of some sort 
is posited, for all agree that some force or power exists 
which is the world-ground or the ultimate cause of all things. 
Disagreement comes only when an attempt is made to locate 
the same. 
That a .real problem exists in this matter is patent 
when we stop to consider, in the first place ,the numerous 
attempts that have been made to arrive at a correet conclusion 
concerning causation. This fact gives testimony, not only to 
the complexity of the problem, but al'so to its importance • 
Another reason for this importance is not far to seek. 
There is perhaps no philosophical problem which does not in 
17. 
some manner find itself rooted in causality. Thus the problem 
of knowledge has its foundation here; solve the problem of 
causality and you have a solution to the problem of knowledge. 
The problem of substance also has its solution here. In d e ed, 
all philosophical problems have causality as their center and 
base. Hence · :, without fear of contradict ion , we venture 
the statement that in the problem of causality the very 
fundamentals of all philosophical thinking are involved. 
Says j3olliger," Wenn ich hier ein so schwieriges Problem wie 
das der causalita et X~ zu eroerten mich unterfange, so wird 
es Keinem einen Augenblick zweifelhaft sein, dass damit die 
Grundfra~en alles philosophischen Denkens beruehrt werden 
1 
rnuessen." 'fhus if anyone thinks the universe at all, he must 
necessarily think of the phenomena of our empirical world; if 
he thinks of phenomena he is forced to think of change and 
becoming, and thinking of these he is led to think of the 
cause responsible for such change and becoming. 
But important and fundamental as this problem is, it is 
the most feared problet1 in philosophy. It is considered essen-
tia1_, but a bet e noirJ because of its complexity and obscurity. 
The physicists have answer· ed the qu estions which have arisen 
concerning j_t,, saying, '!Its no use, the idea of cause is inex-
P licable and incorrprehensibletf l1a t. erialista have taken up 
the question and answered it, only to be met by theological 
1 
Das Problem der Causa li t a et --·- Adolph Bolliger. 
18. 
reasoning. Observing the fate of these reasoners, philosophers 
generally have feared to take up the subject because of the 
proximity of quagmires of philosophical contradictions. 
All admit, however, that there is no problem more funda-
mental, none which is so close to the heart and mind o·f every 
thinker. On all sides man finds evidence of causation. It con-
stitute11the warp and woof of the universe and what should be 
more natural than that men should seek to know, in as far as 
possible) the origin of the idea, its source and composition. 
Difficult is the solution of the problem and elusive, but 
should not this fact spur men to greater and better effort 
and endeavor? It is one of the proofs of the greatness and 
nobility of the human mind that it seeks to know the reason 
and nature of the things about him. Man would not be what he is, 
if he did not seek to know the truth, even though a thousand 
times rebuffed. It is true ,as r.otze remarks, that although 
man cannot ho.pe to understand in full the natu:te of the first 
cause, nevertheless," As long as the world lasts, the human 
mind will go on wearying itself out in laboring at this im-
' ' possible task and perhaps, in doing so, find greater enjoyment, 
tl'1..an in the imitation and prosecution of labors, which exper-
ience has taught us are capable of completion and lead to 
indubitxable results. 111 
1 
Introduction to lHkrokosno_us - ·- ----Lotze. 
19. 
AN ANAI.YSIS. 
There are philosophers, and among them Bolliger, a 
German thinker, who contend that it is impossible to state 
independently the problem of causality because it was evolved 
~~ gradually, and ther~, can be understood only by being considered 
historically. Just as it is impossible to understand the anat-
omy of man through the study of a full-grown body, so it is 
impossible to understand the problerr. of causality without 
taking into consideration its history. Moreover, it is asserted 
that just as man cannot be understood isolated from nature and 
the history of the universe, the problem of causality cannot 
be comprehended without the context which history and the 
phenomena with which it deals, furnishK~. 1 
In Bolliger's contention there is much truth, but also 
much that is in need of critical examination. It is true that 
since causality is a relation between substances, anyone attempt-
ing to understand its implications must know something concerning 
the nature of substance. So also it cannot be denied that 
oftentimes it is an advantage to know the history of a problem 
and its development, but we do not agree that it is impossible 
to consider or state a problem independently of its history. 
Ir such were the case, philosophical speculation would be 
laborious and cumbersome, if not impossible; for then, 
·' 
strictly speaking, no problem could be considered without an 
examination of its history. 
1 
See page 2,Das ~roblem der Causalitaet-- BOll iger. 
I 20. 
I 
Therefore) while not denying the importance of the history 
of a question, yet believing there are times when histco;ry 
may be ignored, at least in part, we state independently· the 
problem of causality. 
Aristotle was the first to devote much attention to 
causation. He did not attempt to analyze the idea. His contri-
but ion to the subject conaiHted rather in the classificB"tion 
of the various kinds of causality, than in any satisfactory 
discussion of the ultimate relation between cause and effect. 
He enumerates four different kinds of causation which ever 
since have had a place in philosophy. 
All things are produced either by nature or art and have 
a material cause (~A..~ 1 i.t..ITv!( [L""'!L..Vo t/ ) , a formal cause ( T(;~c·'/sou 1 io it 
- ', '· ./' 1 1 0. { - c (· cl } Thus,to take an example from art. A bed or statue 
presupposes(l) matter;the wood, brass or marble from which it 
is made;(2) a plan or a pattern(an Idea) according to which it 
1 __ .. 
t u l 1 
is made, existing in the mind. of the sculptor or the joiner; 
(3) arms, hands or tools as efficient causes; (4) a purpose ·· or 
motive that sets these forces in action and changes capacity 
, ) I 
or potential.ity(~~~~OL.""-iS ) into actuality( C:r~_- P'/ 'C i o-- ) • In 
nature . we find man a good illustration for these four causes. 
There is first, the substance which forms the substl:atlum 
1 
Metar;hysics 1. , 3. 
21. 
of the embryonic developrr.ent; ( 2) The Idea or type acc<Dirding 
to which the -~bryo is developed; (3) The act of genera tion ; 
(4) The purpose of .this act; namel y, the production of a new 
man. There are then four causes: matter, Idea, force and the 
final purpose. 
To accomplish the purpose of this thesis it is not 
necesaary for us to take into account material, formal, and 
final causes since their problem is so closely interwoven with 
that of efficient causes, that a solution of the latter carries 
with it a solution of the former. It is well however, to 
distinguish between final and efficient causes for these are 
often misunde:rstood and er r oneously used. 
The term final cause owes its origin to the scholastics 
who introduced it into philosophy. The;ttransformed the sub-
) into adjectives : causa 
materialis , effici.ens , formal is , and finalis. Aristotle, 
, ' ,__ , I 
although he uses instead of ( a..- t Tt cL.- 1£ ft. t l h) final cause_) 
' I ( 76 TI r7 o S ) "the end" J explains it thus;" Another sort of cause 
is the end, that is to say, that on account of which ( T!~ c'~Tt- f ,rti\<. ) 
the action is done. For example, in this sense, health is the 
cause of walking exercise. Why does such a one take exercise? VIe 
say it is in order to have good health; and, in speaking thus, 
we mean to name the 1 cause." 
1 
Physics lib. II, Chapt er III. ~uoted by Paul Janet 
in ~inal Causes, Page 1. 
II 
22. 
The general principle of causation, on the other hand, accor-
L .l 
ding to Paul Janet is" une loi necessaire de lesprit, loi ob-
f I ' phenomenes saus exception, loi necessaire jective de tous lee 
c I 
et partout verifiee par la reproduction 
I 
constante des phenom-
~nee daus lee ~mea condition~s." 1 
,, 
The following quotation taken from his work Les Causes 
II 
Finales sets before us the distinction between final and effic-
ient causes. He says"Si je contemple la cha1ne des Alpes , et 
I • I J lee formes innombrables, etrauges et compl1quees qu ont prises 
I lee pies dont se compose cette chafne, la loi de causalite me 
\ ) \ 
force a admettre que clmcune delles, si accidentelle quelle 
( I I 
puisse paraitre, a sa cause determinee et precise; mais je 
I l 
ne suis nullement force d ad.mettre que chacune de ces formes, 
I I , , }\}\.. G 
ioi pointues la echaucices, la aaondies, a une fin et un but" 
" . 
In this dissertatlon we have to d.o with an examination 
of efficient causatioh only, but care must be taken to dis-
tinguish carefully between the cause itself, as a power or 
force, and the concept of cause. The former :•e shall examine 
to ascertain , if possible its nature; the latter . we sha ll ) 
anal~ze for the purpose of determining its origin and validity. 
1•1oreover, it is necessary for us to have a clear under-
standing as to what the terms cause and effect denote , and 
in what their relation consists. Cause and effect cannot be 
thought of as independent and separate. The nature of cause is 
rele.tive and has no meaning apart from effect. :Further, such a 
1 
2 
Janet, Les Causes Finales :rpage 9,top. 
Ibid page s 7-e .• 
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relation has no real existence; it is merely a thought product. 
We constantly thl.nk causality into things which are in fact 
free from any such relation. The popular idea concerning 
the temporal relation between cause and effect is erroneous, 
since cause cannot be prior to effect. A cause cannot be suoh 
until the effect arises. 
All philosophical theories fall into two classes or 
divisions: theories of knowing and theories of being. The lat-
ter are the ultm-tate aim of philosophy but cannot be com-
pleted without the former. The two are simply phases of the 
same question and have no strict line of demarcation. The 
metaphysician must show that the causal idea as made to ap-
pear necessary by critical analysis and logical thought, real-
ly is demanded by the relations found immanent in the ontolog-
ical world. Epistemology is the foundation upon which meta-
physic~ builds. Philosophical schools usually emphasize one 
or the other of these divisions. The phenomenalist makes the 
f'orms and laws of change and becoming the gist of the princi-
ple of' causality; the realist posits as its kernal, change and 
becorning1 with an absolute substance as their foundation. In our 
investigations of this problem we meet eight contrasting views, 
viz: sensationalism and intellectualism; positivism and ration-
alism; empiricism and apriorism; realism and phenornenalisrn~and 
· idealism and necessitarianism. 
·. 
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EPISTEMOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS. 
--------~-------------------
The problem of causality has two phases, an epistemological 
and a metaphysical. The first suggests three questions:(a)What 
is the source of the idea? (b) What validity has it? and (c) 
What is the form of its application? 
In the past there l~s been not a little discussion concern-
ing these questions. Some philosophers have held that external 
objects give us this idea. Such a theory is untenable since 
objects themselves are but thought products and therefore can-
not be causes. Since objects cannot give rise to the idea of 
causality, the mind must be posited as its source. Simple as 
seems this truth, many centuries elapsed before it was evolved. 
Concerning the next point, whether or not reason can be 
trusted to give us the truth; whether or not the categories of 
the understanding give us a true report of things,much has 
conjectured. Some thinkers contend that without trusting to 
the veracity of reason all knowledge is impossible, others 
assert that knowledge of a certain kind is posoible, even though 
the reason is not relied upon. Since such knowledge is valjd 
in practical life it · mattera little if we are deceived by the 
understanding as to the ultimate nature of things. 
The third point, namely, the form of the app~ication of 
this idea constitutes the crux of the ep istemologfual problem. 
Philosophers agree that a causal ground must be affirmed,but are ,<t 
' I 
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one as to the form and place ·of that ground; neither are they 
able unanimously to fix the form in which causality itself 
must be conceived. The intricacies of the problem may well 
be observed from an examination of the efforts put forth to 
arrive at a satisfactory solution. 
Galileo, evolving a mechanical view of nature, located 
causality in a physical antecedent. Such a tenet is easily 
shown to be vacuous, because of certain metaphysical consider-
ations. Things are not real in space , hence a physical ante-
cedent cannot be said to be a cause. A p~sical series may 
exist without any causal connection between its members. The 
more one studies the problem the more one becomes convinced 
that true causality cannot be found in the phenomenal world. 
It resides rather beyond it. 
BUt even if we react from this theory and agree that 
the members of the causal series, antecedent and consequent, 
exist only through the unity of the mind and thought, we yet 
have our troubles. 
It is true, the membe.rs of such a series exist in and 
through thought, and are determined with reference to one another 
and thus exist in mutual relations. This reciprocity is logical 
and exists only in and through consciousness. When we come 
to a real system apart from our own consciousness and our 
own thinking, then comes the question: How shall this 
causal idea, this reciprocity be realized in actuality2 
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Is it thus realized? What is beyond our thought which binds 
· the system together? We are sure there must be reciprocity 
of some sort, but how this relation is dynamically founded is 
not easily discovered. 
Finally, the notion of causality itself is not per-
fectly transparent. Many thinkers are satisfied with saying 
that causality is action. But what sort of action? How does 
it work? We trace effects to causes and empirical ones at 
that, and there we are compelled to stop because of certain 
insuperable problems and implications. 
The problem of causality leads to two ultimate 
problems, the nature and origin of knowledge. 
The first of these has to do with the question: 
What is knowledge? Realism and phenomenalism have grappled 
with it. Radically different have been their answers. Realism 
contends that knowledge is an adequate copy of reality; in 
true knowledge objects appear as they exist in reality, only 
they are not reality itself. Phenomenalism , on the other hand, 
regards this conception as erroneous. It asksr How can knowl-
edge be a copy and at the same time, as it were , a repetition 
of things? Knowledge is nothing but an inner psychical process, 
how can there be a similarity between it and external objects? 
Even granting that such similarity exists how <Dan we know it· ;for 
2?. 
we cannot get ouside of ourselves to compare our ideas 
with the objects. 
The second question}is: How does a knowledge of causality 
arise? Two schools have attempted to answer this query, the 
empiricist and the rationalist, whose treatment of the same 
have been antithetical. The former contends, that all knowledge 
is derived from perception;experience is its sole source 
and is cons~tuted by a combinations of percepts. The latter 
asserts_,that all really scientific knowledge presupposes another 
principle which cannot be derived from perception. Necessity 
and Universality , two factors found in their most absolute 
form in mathematics , and aimed at by all sciences, can never 
arise from experience. Experience reveals only what happens in 
particular cases and not what happens universally. Real 
science originates in the understanding, which forms concepts 
and follows out their relation in conformity with an inner 
necessity. 
Ontological Problems. 
----------------------
From an ontological point of view we study causation 
in the sense of productive activity and efficiency. Two ques-
tiona at once arise. First , can we know anything concerning 
first causes, or must we because of our limitations, remain im 
doubt and ignorance? Is it possible to know whether the con-
cept of causality is valid in the ontological world or no? 
If so, what is the form and nature of its application? 
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The nature of the first cause constitutes the second 
question. Uust it be thought as free and intelligent, or 
mechanical and impersonal? Even if we should be able to 
show tr~t the first cause must be thought free and intel-
ligent, is it certain that it has these attributes in real-
ity? 
Over and above these implications, an examination of 
the metaphysical phase of the principle of causation leads 
to two ultimate questions: the ontological and cosmological 
problems. 
The first of these we express by the question: · In what 
does the nature of reality as such exist? This is a complex 
problem, for reality appears before us as something very 
heterogeneous. Different sciences show us how many-sided and 
complex it is. P~sics views it as a body which occupies 
space and moves in space, and all its efforts tend to reduce 
rational phenomena to regular movements of particles occupying 
space. In the mental sciences we meet reality as something 
different: here it appears as something sensitive, full of 
thought, feeling, and willing. Psychology deals with processes 
of consciousness, phenomena which we can neither see, touch, 
measure or at all conceive as processes in space. 
13ut does reality consist of two entirely different kinds 
of existence? Can the two forms , the physical and the psychical, 
• 
II 
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be reduced to one? If not, what is their relation? 
Dualism, materialism, and spiritualism or idealism1 have 
~ hazarded answers. Dual~ holds that there are two heterogeneous 
kinds of reality, two kinds of substances: corporeal and mental, 
extended and thinking substance. Co~non-sense has been well-sat-
isfied with ~his solution. Philosophy has always sought to 
overcome dualism, to reach monism, because of the uni w which 
appears so great on all sides. It repudiates the view which 
would regard the universe as composed of two entirely hetero-
geneous elements. Uaterialism says that such a unity indeed 
exists, but body and motion constitute reality; states of con-
sciousness being mere forms of processes which are themselves 
physical. Spiritualism or idealism affirma,that mental processes 
compose reality; the physical world is its phenomenal form. 
Agnostic monism, on the other hand, declares that we are in 
no way able to know reality. As our first data we have two 
forms, the corporeal and the spiritual. We think they are mani-
festations of one unattainable reality, but we do not know. 
The next question is the cosmological or theological • . What 
conception shall we form of the connection between things? 
What is the form · of reality as a whole? Diff erent answers 
are given ·by atomism, theism and pantheism. 
Atomism d~scribes r.eali ty as consisting. of a plurality 
• 
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of independent objects .All are related to each other, but 
exist each independently. These atoms are underived, and 
impenetrable elements. Together they constitute reality. 
Through their combination the universe is formed. 
The monistic view of the world exists in two forms. 
Either it derives the unity and harmony of things from the 
action of the architectonic intelligence, operating according 
to a uniform plan, in which case we have theism. Or it seeks 
a far more thorough-going unity and maintains that reality is 
a single ·unity, a being, a substance, having plurality sys-
tematically arranged into an ordered unity, which gives us 
pantheism. Which of these theories is correct? What is the 
solution to this problem? Many attempts have been made to 
answer these questions. 
• 
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IUPOllTANCE OF KANT'S ANALYSIS . 
It is not the aim of this dissertation to give an account 
o:f the answer~modern philosophers have made to these problems, 
although incidentially their views will be indicated. 
It is our aim to set forth Kant's analysis. We have chosen 
his speculations in preference to t .ihose of other thinkers 
because they are the resultant of two philosophical movements 
of great importance. We quote Dr. W. Windelband as follows: 
" The pre-eminent position of the Koenigberg philosopher rests 
upon the fact that he took upon himself the various motives 
of thought in the literature of the en,lightenment, and by 
their reciprocal supplementation matur~d a completely new con-
ception of the problem and procedure of philosophy." 1 
Moreover, by examining the very postulates of reason itself 
before attempting to solve the problems before him, Kant 
initiated a new era in philosophy;an era, which is distinguished 
by a clearness of thought and lucidity of reason, such as the 
world never before witnessed. Says Professor Caird:" So much 
has Kant's fertile idea changed the aspect of the intellectual 
world, that there is not a single problem of philosop~ that 
does not meet us with a new face; and it is perhaps not un-
fair to say, that the speculations of all those who have not 
2 learned the lesson are beside the point." 
1 
Geschichte der Philosophie -Windelband. Trans.by TuftS 
2 
Critical Philosophy of Kant ---Pagel20 -E. Caird. 
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Further, Kant's speculations on these problems form the 
starting point of much> if not all; the worth . .while philosoph-
ic effort since his time. The German philosopher Fortlage~ 
' · :,~ 
puts the matter graphically when he writes:" In one word, Kant's 
system is the gate through which everything that has stirred 
the philosophical world since his time, comes and goes. It 
is the Universal Exchange where all circulating ideas flow 
together before they vanish again in distant places. It is 
the London of philosophy, sending ita ships into every part 
of the world, and after a time receiving them back. There is 
no place in the whole globe of human thought which it has not 
l 
visited, explored, and coloni~ed." 
Finally , the fact that Kant's conclusions have found 
acceptance with , and commend themsel vea in whole or in part . 
to a host of eminent philosophers, makes them worthy of our 
especial investigation and thought. 
In this dissertation it is not our aim to give an exhaus-
tive account of Kant's system of philosophy. We content our-
selves with giving a resume of his analysis and the causes 
and processes of thought which led him to posit the same. 
Incident~ally, we shall make such criticisms as seem 
to us valid, both as concerns Kant's solution and his method 
of development. 
l 
Q,uoted by Max Mueller in the Preface to his 
!llranslation of the Kritique of Pure Heason. 
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KANT' S PREDECESSORS. 
In order that Kant's analysis of the problem of causality 
may be understood, it is desirable to examine the factors and 
forces which in a great measure gave shape to it. These forces 
cannot be traced directly back to the beginning of philosophy, 
as may be seen by an examination of the speculations of the 
early philosophers. 
No doubt the changes in nature first awoke, as in other 
peoples, the philosophical spirit of the Grecians. A resting 
object does not attract the attention of an observer looking 
around causall~ , and does not stimulate thought. An active 
object gives impetus to speculation. It is the same phenomenon 
one observes in connection with a babe in the cradle. The 
infant does not observe the broad expanse of the wall, but the 
small bodies upon it which move ·and are active. Neither does 
a young child notice the dial of a clock; his interest and 
curiosity are excited by the moving pendulum. So with the 
Greeks. It was their aim to explain all change and becoming 
because these attracted them in .a special way. 
They sought to unify the universe, and attempted 
to bring all reality under the jurisdiction of one principle 
through which and from which , all reality was to be evolved. 
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!hie principle was not - something outside or transcendenta l 
to the various phases of reality, such as change or becoming. 
It constituted a concrete element of the universe. Water , air 
and fire were posited as principles with such a unity. 
This stage of philosophy might well be designated as nature 
worship, which seeks out several mighty forces of nature and 
makes them idols and the cause of the universe. However, the 
philosophy of the Grecians differs from nature-worship or 
religion, in that it constantly insists upon a sing1e principle, 
IV 
while the latter postulates a dualty of princi:ples. Moreover, 
.~ 
the Greeks did not set the process of the creation of individ-
ual things under the figure of birth as usually is done in nature 
religion, but rather thought of creation as a mechanical process. 
How it is possible for even a single priLnciple to give a 
universe existence they did not attempt to explain, at least, 
we find nothing concerning this. 
THE FIRST PHILOSOFllll:RS. 
The first philosophers were content with an attempt to 
find for the 'many' a unity and considered themselves fortunate 
to have even named a pr incip~e, which might be considered 
the basis and ground of the universe. How one substance is 
transb>rmed into another they did not stop to ·.reflect •. Dr. 
Adolph Bolliger remarks:" Wie ee nun moeglich, das eine Ur-
princip alles Uebrige aus sich hervorgehen lassen soll, wird 
nicht weiter ueberlegt oder wenigstene nicht gesagt. Dae erste 
35. 
philosophische Denken ist befriedigt, wenn es der anstoes-
sigen, verwunde1·lichen Vielhei t gegenueber irgend eine Einhei t 
gefunden, und wenn es die Bewegung als Grundgesetz jenes ein-
heitlichen Principe, und als den Grund der verschiedenen Ent-
1 
wickelungspbasen und Formen des Seinenden p;enannt hat." 
Thales posited water as the unitary principle lying back 
of the never-ending process of change in the universe, but was 
satisfied to point out its visible transformations in nature, 
and did not attempt to explain the metaphysics of the phenom-
enon. He assumed the fact of change as something self- evident 
and took for granted that water furnished the principle for the 
unity underlying the changing world. He brought forward no proof 
for this assumption. Therefore, although .the new attitude in-
valved here has real significance because it adopts a scientific, 
as opposed to a mythological point of view, it has no bearing 
upon the problerr. of causality. 
Heraclitus held ti1at change is the Lord of the uni-
verse, and fire the ultimate ground of the world. There is 
unity in the universe, but it is not one of unchanging subs-tance 
but of law. What law is over and above the multitude of partie-
ular facts and changes, he does not attempt to exr lain. 
Later philosopllers, such as Parmenides and Plato, con-
tributed but little, in a direct way, to an understanding ot 
the problem of causality. 
1 
Das Problem der Causalitaet.-Page 6--Bolliger. 
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Parmenides basls his system upon the absolute denial of 
change and multiplicity in the world, and their reduction to 
pure illusion. He asserts tl~t only the One exists, and that 
One is eternal, immutable, invariable and indivisible. He does 
not consider it necessary to prove his contention, considering 
it a postulate of great cogent evidence. Into this All-one, 
the rnanifoldness of all things has sunk, he assures us, but how 
this occurred he does not · enlighten us. 
Plato's doctrine of Ideas demands that the ~dea be re-
garded as the cause of occurrence and change. The Idea, how-
ever, is incompetent to explain empirical reality in a meclmn-
ical sense, because it is :posited as absolutely unchangeable 
and immovable, witbout origin and imperishable, as well as in-
corporeal. Ther efo.re 1 Plato declares 1 all change and occurrence 
exist for the sake of the Idea; the Idea is the final cause of 
phenomena. The truth of the world lies in the Idea,or the Good, 
and no partie~ thing retains for a moment any validity apart 
from this all-embracing whole. We read in the Laws:" The ruler 
of the universe has ordered all things with a view to the 
preservation and protection of the whole, and each part has an 
appointed state of action and passion. And one of the portions 
of the universe is thine own, stubborn man-------- you are 
created for the sake of the whole and not the whole for the 
1 
sake of you. " 
1 
Laws--903 -:aurnet' s Early Greek Philosophers ( A &C Black} 
• 
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Hencej in its highest state, the world is not mechanical 
but teleological. Plato does not prove his premise. He sim-
ply seta up postulates of teleology and develops them in 
mythical,figurative form.As a · resul~,the problem of causation 
remains undiscovered. 
Even Aristotle, withall his researches, fails to get at 
the essence of the problem. With him, the prime mover of the 
universe is quite the same as Plato's Idea of Good. 
It is characteri4ed as eternal, unchangeable, immovable, wholly 
independent, separated from all else, incorporeal, and yet at 
the same time the cause of all generation and change. Aristotle 
describes this highest being as to content, thought; and 
though~lone; not thought considered as a mental process having 
to do with individual things, but pure thought, which is em-
ployed with nothing but itself and its eternal nature. 
Significant as are these conceptions in the history of 
philosophy, since they scientifically ground and formulate 
spiritual monotheism; they do not, it is patent, touch upon 
the problem of causality. 
The reason why the early Gr eek :philosnphe:rs did not 
reflect concerning causality as did Hume, Locke and Kant~ 
is to be found in the fact that their pantheistic or material-
istic ontology paral~zed all thought concerning becoming, 
and made it impossible to reason clearly concerning causation. 
A further reason is the fact that constantly before 
38. 
attempting to analyze, to seek a reason for a given :phenorn-
enon, to philosophize concerning it, certain postulu,tes must 
have been made. It is only later that reflection takes place. 
It is not until the t:ime of Descartes and his contempor-
aries that the modern idea of cause and substance took definite 
form and root. Descartes, in contrast to the Greek philosophers, 
turned away frorr. objective knowledge to self as the clew to 
the interpretation of reality,and thereby made possible 'tfue 
modern conception of cause and substance. 
Systems of Rationalism. 
--- .... ..:.'-' •: .... ..:.:• : -·· '-·· ----' -- .. .~.-. ....., ...... --
It is with -Descarteca ( 1596- 1650 ) that modern philosophy 
is generally supposed to begin. His philosophical dmctrine 
has especial significance: (1) It is based upon a definite 
method, the mathematical; (2) It recognizes the modern princi-
ple of individuality and subjectivity; (3) It makes clear the 
distinction between mind and body, and thus creates a starting-
point for fruitful development. By the setting up of an immater-
ial reality alongside the material world, the need for some 
means for connecting the two, was forced into notice. 
Like his predecessors Descartes holds fast to four types 
of causality, causa materialis, efficiene, formalis and 
finalis. As a rule we find that the causa efficiens absorbs 
< 
e 
39. 
the causa materialis and forrnalis. Descartes was led to de-
clare himself specifically concerning the concept of causal-
ity in the course of a discussion between himself and Gassendi, 
one of his contemporaries. The issue between the two men is found 
in the statement, that all that is found in the consequent 
must be contained potentially or immanently in the antecedent. 
Gassendi affirmed this proposition, holding that the material 
out of which any object is made, must be in existence before-
hand. Descartes denied it, and would have the proposition 
apply to the causa efficiens only. 
A further occasion folf dispute was the question 
whether effect follows cause in time, or only in a logical 
way. Gassendi affirmed that effect follows cause in sequence 
of time. Descartes in rebuttal stated, that cause has only the 
appearance of being antecedent to effect, but in reality is 
coexistent with it. The one cannot exist without the o,ther. 
Every effect has a cause, since,ex nihilo nihil fit. This cause 
is not rr.aterial nor potential but efficient and immanent, and 
therefore cannot be said to be before its effect in time.1 
Descartes' position is made clear further by his 
speculations concerning the nature of the world. The world, he 
contends, is composed of mind and matter, ideas and quantum. 
These two elements form a dualism, although both have their 
source in the same substance. This substance is God who 
creates matter and gives to man, mind; and to the mind, innate 
1 
Meditations de ~rima Philosophia - III - Ed. Cousin. 
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ideas. He declares both of these factors to be aspects of 
God. They cannot interact or interfere with one another, 
since a thing cannot interfere with itself. However, since 
they are attributes of the same subject a definite relation 
exists between them. An interaction takes place thr cugh the 
agency of God, who created the two substances. How this is 
possible,we do not know; the fact remains, that a definite 
relation exists between ideas !=1-nd matter, the psychical 
and the physical worlds. 
Although Descartes does not attempt to analyze 
the nature of the first cause, his speculations are signif-
icant, because they give a clear statement of the problem 
of causality. The problem is: What principle causes the world 
of ideas and the world of matter to interact? How is a relation 
between mind and ma ttel.' effected? The answer is: God, the 
sole foundation of all things, effects in some mysterious 
manner a relation between mind and matter, the physical and 
the psychical worlds. 
Descartes contribution to the development of the 
problem of causality lies in the method by means of which he 
evolved his system. In order tt1at he may make no mistake in 
his meditations he decides never to regard anything as 
true which he does not know t ,o be so, which does 
not present itself so clearly to his consciousness and 
I 
I 
II 
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~mind that he shall never have occasion to call it in ques-
tion. In his" Principia Philosophiae" we read:" Sic autem rejic-
ientes illa omia, de quibus aliquo modo possumus dubitare ac 
etiam falsa esse fingentes; facile quidem supponimus nullum 
esse Deum, nullum coelum, nulla corpora; nosque etiam ipsos 
non habere manus, nee pedes, nee denique ullum corpus; non 
1 
autem ideo qui talia cogitamus nihil esse." 
One thing he finds unquestionably true - he certainly 
thinks - and from this it follows that he, himself, exists. 
2 Cogito, ergo sum. It is not of hin1self as a natural or bod-
ily substance but only as a thinker, that he is made thus cer-
tain. Among his thoughts he finds one unlike all others - the 
thought of an absolutely perfect and infinite being. \Vhence 
comes this thought, and what of it? It cannot. come from him-
self, for there is nothing in himself corresponding to such an 
idea. The greater cannot proceed from the less. There must be 
some being containing all those perfections of which his own in-
ferior mind is able to from an idea, else he could never have 
had the idea of such a being,more perfect than himself. That 
being , perfect and infinite, is God. 
Descartes turns away from the objective world and makes 
the mind the field of observation. The knowledge of God 
is sought and found in the soul. Observation and reasoning 
1 
Principia Philosophiae, 1. ?.-Descartes. 
2 
Discours de la Methode, Oeuvres- Ed. Cousin- II ,158. 
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form the basis of his system. A priori dedootiona complete the 
structure. 'Fhe result is rationalism. 
TH.E! DISCIPLES OF TIESCARTES. 
The disciples of Bescartes • Ualebranche and Geulincx 
agreed that the world consists of mind and matter, ideas and 
1 quantum, but were not content to dismiss the problem of causal-
ity as did their master, with general statements • . Descartes had 
admitted the fact of mutual influence between soul and body, with-
out going on to explain its possibility. They wished to reach 
if possible, the deeper aspects of the question. They found 
little difficulty in understanding the immanent causal process-
es of the spatial and conscious worlds, but found that a prob-
lem presented itself, when it carne to the transcendental proc-
esses from one of these worlds to the other. For example, they 
found no difficulty in the idea that one motion transformed 
itself into another, but could not understand how a sensation 
should come out of a motion, or a motion out of will. Thus their 
problem was found in psycho-physical causality. 2 
YALEBRAHCHE. 
Ualebranche, more than Descartes, emphasized the ration-
ality of the rela.tion between cause and effect. He gi vee this 
definition of causality;" True cause is a cause, which the 
1 
2 
Ethics Page 124 -Geulincx.- Rech.de la Ver.III,2.Malebrancl:u.. 
Windelband's Geschichte der Philosophie-Trans by Tufts. 
~ 4il4~ . 
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intellect sees as a necessary link between cause and 
1 
effect." 
Like .Descartes he scorns the idea that time is 
an element in causality. He denies especially that the human 
will is a first agent in causation, and declares that it is 
absurd to think that it is the cause of the ideas that we 
have of objects. 
Malebranche admits that ideas present themselves 
to our minds when we wish fu,ezn, but what follows, only 
that, " according to the order of nature the will is always 
necessary, so that we may have these ideas, but not that the 
will is the .true and fundamental cause which makes them to be 
present to the spirit, and less yet, that the will creates 
2 
them from nothing." 
The fact of the regular and constant appearing of 
two phenomena like will and idea he seeks to explain by means 
of an occasional cause. Between God's will and man's will 
there is a necessary relation. Only through the action of the 
former upon the latter, is it possible for man to perceive 
the external world. Even then, man does not know real bodies 
except through their ideas in God. These ideas are archetypes 
of the actual world created by him. He is the principle making 
1 
J,ib. II, 3. Recherche de la Verite. " Cause veritable 
est une cause entre laquelle et son effet lesprit appercoit 
une liaison necessaire." 
2 
Lib. II,3. 
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possible a relation between cause and effect. 
Geulincx. 
With this philosopher, as with his predecessors, causality 
is not found in the finite world. He proceeds from the prin-
1 
ciple that no one can do that which he does not know how to do. 
~herefore, since no one knows how to set to work to raise even 
an arm, the mind · cannot be said to be the cause of bodily move-
ments. So also the cause of perception is not to be sought in 
the mind, for the mind does not know how it comes to perceive. 
Neither is the cause of perception to be sought in bodies for 
they are inanimate and have no ideas at all. Nothing is left, 
but to seek the idea of cause in God. He it is who imparts 
motion to matter and invests it with laws. He also forroo my 
will and unites it in such a way with the material body that 
will and movement must correspond to one another like two 
clocks, which follow the same course and strike at the same 
time, not because the one effects the other, but because they 
" 
are made by one and the same maker. Absque ulla causalitate 
qua alterum ~oc in altero causat, sed propter meram dependentiarn 
2 
qua utrumq_ue ab eadem arte et simili industria constitutum est" 
aod is thus made the occasional cause and the principle which 
relates cause and effect. 
SPINOZA. 
Following the occasionaltsts comes Spinoza. With his pred-
1 
Ethics Page 113. 
2 
Ethics Page 124, note 19. 
• 
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ecessors he believes that God is the sole cause of all that 
is created. ~his God, however, is not the God of popu~ar 
belief., as may be seen from his definitions • . He says," BY 
self caused( causa sui) I understand that of which the essence 
involves existence, that is, whose nature cannot be conceived 
otherwise than existing. BY substance I understand that, which 
is in itself and is conceived by itself; that is, whose con-
cept needs not the concept of another thing for which ,it is 
to be formed from. By God , I understand a being, absolutely 
infinite, that is, substance consisting of infinite attributes, 
h f h t 1 d . f . . t b . //l w ereo eac one expresses e erna an 1n 1n1 e e1ng. 
Spinoza does not tell us what he means by cause in any 
2 
other sense. 
His agreement with Malebranche and Geulincx, exists more 
in the motive and the word, than in the meaning and the spirit 
of the doctrine. !fheformer posit God as the creator of the 
universe; Spinoza makes him the universal essence, and de-
scribes the world as following necessarily from his nature. 
3 
God is made to be the very world itself. 
Spinoza has for his axiom that nothing happens through 
chance. In his Ethics prop.29 we read," In the nature of things 
there is no such thing as chance, but everything is determined 
by the necessity of the nature of the divine,to be, and act 
in a certain manner." Everything must be what it is" just as from 
l 
Ethical -~- Spinoza, His Life and Phil.-Pollock- page 149. 
Pollock -page 149. 
3 
Ethics l,Axiom 8. 
I 
l 
II 
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the definition of a triangle - the equality of the sum of 
1 
its angles to two right angles follows." 
Thus the world is made to be dependent upon God as a 
consequent upon its ground. In other words, the world is God 
and God is the world. When God is called the cause of things, 
cause and effect are not to be considered .different things, but 
identical; the latter being merely the revelation of the nature 
of the cause. God's works, unlike the works of man, are the ; 
same as himseif. He .is the immC3:'nent, not the transitiye cause. 
He remains in his \'O:rk and his vo rk remains in him, beyond 
2 
this neither can go. 
Spinoza would have us distinguish between God and all 
particular phenomena. The latter are nature as it is begotten; 
and the former, nature as it begets. Between the two there is 
no external separation. With him every particular phenomenon 
is but a limited form of the one infinite substance. Spinoza 
believes that ideas and matter co~mpose the universe, but it 
is the same divine essence which exists in the form of exten-
sian, and in the form of consciousness. The two are so related 
to each other, that to every mode of the one, a definite mode 
of the other corresponds. ~he two realms are parallel; ordo 
d ' 3 idearum idem est ac or o rerum. 
1 
Ethics prop. 17. 
2 
Compare Ethics I Appendill : explicui quod onmia in deo 
sint et ab eo ita pendeant ut sine eo nee esse nee concipi 
possint. 
Ethics II ~rop. 7. 
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This correspondence solves the enigma of the connection of the 
two worlds. Ideas are determined by ideas and motions only by 
motions, but since both are attributes of the Deity it is the 
like content of the two which forme the connection of the one 
class, and also of the other. Since both the world of ideas 
and the world of matter are God, a connection between the two 
is . easily imagined; in fact, there has been no separation at all. 
Spjnoza's speculations are open to grave criticism be-
cause they result in pantheism. Pantheism is untenable since 
it makes God, both an active spirit and a passive substance. 
Again, it is vacuous for the reason that it makes the thoughts 
of man, God's thoughts, and the deeds of the finite the deeds 
of the infinite. 
Nevertheless, Spinoza made an advance over the oc-
casionalists and added not a little to the development of 
the idea of causality , in that he made cause and effect 
identical. This was a step in the right direction since~"By 
making mind and matter, soul and body, manifestations of a 
common pri.nciple, it destroys the dualism of a physical uni-
verse, absolutely divested of all ideal content, and an ex-
1 
elusively intellectual order of things." 
Spinoza even more than Descartes made use of 
the geometrical method, asserting that it has at 
1 
Weber--History of Philosopby--Page 342. Trans. by Thilly. 
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~ the same time a material as well as £or.mal significance~ 
and that the real process of the procedure of things 'from 
God must be thought after the analogy of the logical procedure 
of the consequent from its ground or reason; 
Leibnitz. 
--------------
Leibnitz sought to improve upon the work of his pred-
ecessors by studying the working of nature_, to see if it is 
not possible, instead of merely postulating a cause as had 
been done,to arrive at a mechanical explanation of nature 
and thus to an understanding of efficient causes. By tracing 
the whole series of mechanical events back to efficient causes 
he hoped to arrive at an understanding of the import of 
their working a..s a whole. 
In the course of his speculations he was led to posit 
cause as more than mere being ; it was a force, a substance , 
more tl~n an attribute of unchangeable existence or a modi-
fication, determination or specification of a fundamental 
reality. Substance took on the meaning of force. La substance 
) 2 
est un etre capable daction. 
The essential attribute of God was conceived to be 
Creative force. It is Leibnitz's central thought, that this 
creative force evinces itself in the mechanical system 
of motions.3 It is made the basis of his system. This force 
l 
Ethics I Axiom 3. 
2 
Prine. de la nat. et de la Grace, I 
3 
See Windelband-History of Philosophy page 421. 
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has its existence in entitie~ which he designates , monads. 
Four distinct classes are specified~(l) 'Phose which compose 
material objects, manifesting only physical qualities:(2) ~hose 
which form the souls of beasts, having indistinct consciousness; 
(3) Those who compose the souls of men, having a clear and 
distinct consciousness; and finally,(4) God, the original, 
absolute eternal monad, the Monas Uonadum, the origin of 
1 d b . 1 all know edge an e~ng. 
Myriads of them exist, but !they ar e independent 
entities and can have no interaction with each other. Monads, 
" like a separate world, self-sufficient, independent of every 
2 
other crea ture, embracing the infinite, express the universe." 
God is the central monad and the ground and cause of 
all existing monads. He exists according to the principle 
of contradiction, with logical or absolute necessity. He it 
is who gives to the lesser monads their own particular content 
and grade of representative activity and intensity. Moreover .. 
the divine power has so constituted and arranged the inter-
nal changes in each monad so as to agree with the corr~spond­
ing changes in the monads with which it is immediately con-
.. ,.
nected. !his pre-established harmony is described by Leibnitz 
as follows:" ~y a contrivance of divine fore-knowledge , 
which has from the beginning formed each of these substances 
in so perfect, so regular and accurate a manner, that by 
1 
Monadologie Sec?. 
2 
Sec. 16 Nouveau systeme de la Nature.- Duncans ;ranslation 
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merely following its own laws, which were given to it when it 
came into being, each substance is yet in harmony with the 
other, just as if there were a mutual influence between them 
1 
or as if God were putting his hand upon them." 
Leibni tz was led to this conclusion in attempti.ng to 
ans'rrer the queRt ion, 11 What reality does motion itself possess, 
and what is its cause?" He answers, frue reality is not a 
motion but a force, which remains constant even though motion 
ceases. mhis force alone has existence and finds its source 
in the central monad, God. 
As a presupposition of all the applications of the 
concept of force, he places the idea of law. 0.losely connected 
with this idea is that of individuality, by which he 
understands the law according to which the inner changes of 
an individual take place. The very essence of an individual 
consists in the law of the sequence of these changes. The law 
is simply the manner and mode in which the first cause acts. 
Leib:nitz's theory of causality is open to criticism 
for it involves the contradictory statementstthat the universe 
ia made up of independent entities which have no interaction 
with each other,and that God is the central monad, which is 
the cause of the world. Says Dr. Koenig," Da jede Monade 
von allen Uebrigen voellig abhaenig ist, so ist nicht einzusehen 
in welchem Sinne einer ihrer Zustande auf etwas auser ihr 
. h 
2 befindliches Bezug haben koenne." 
1 
Monadologie Page 331. 
2 
Die Entwickelung des causals Problems. Page 116-Koenig. 
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!:.eibni tz laid the basis for a better understanding of the 
problem of causality by insisting upon an identity of the part 
with the whole and elaborating a system in which unity is found 
in plurality. So also, the conception of an active force, which 
supers.eded the dualism of thought a~-extension, marks 
advance. 
an 
Kan~attracted by Leibnitz's theory of pre-established 
harmony deliberated whether it might not solve the mystery 
of the relation between thought and being. He soon found that 
this doctrine was a metaphysical assumption and was led to make 
original investigations concerning the relation of knowledge 
to its object. 1 
CHIUSTIA:H .WOLFF. 
----------~-~-~-~-
Wolff supplied to Leibnitz's system what was previously 
wanting, a clear, connected, methodical form. He applied to 
the whole a strictly mathematical method and gave to the 
system a complete scientific form. 
In his opinion the main task of ontology is to show how 
physics may arrive at a certain knowledge concerning nature 
2 
and its causes. . ~o an understanding of the causal idea in 
nature, he insists, it is necessary to remember that one cause 
often produces many effects, which must be differentiated~ a 
thing which is not always done. For example, he that fires a 
~n is usually designated as the cause of the explosion and 
1 
Kant's letter to Marcus Herz. Feb. 1 1772. 
2 
Phil. prima S'iv~ntologia • Sec 896. --Wolff. 
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the wound that may be produced. Such causes are subordinate 
and depend for their efficiency upon other causes. They form 
one of a chain of such a nature, that the actions of the 
one depends upon the other. In aerie causarum subordinatarum 
1 proxime praecedens disponit sequentum ad agendum. True science 
must seek to find a first cause, for this alone is the ground 
of all effect. In explicandis effectibus subsistendum est 
in causa proxima, si tantummodo intelligere velimus, quomodo 
2 ipse actum fuerit consecutus. 
Wolff criticised Leibnitz because he gave no proof of 
the prindiple of sufficient reason, which played so .prominent 
a part in his system. He himself , therefore, sought to deduce 
a proof. He placed at the head of his ontology, the principle 
of contradiction and that of sufficient reason, and sought to 
substantiate the latter through proof: " Where there is no 
reason, there is nothing by which we can understand why a thing 
is, and it must therefore arise ·out of nothing. But since it 
is impossible that anything can come out of nothing, everything 
must have · its sufficien.t reason, why it is. n3 
Although Wolff here reasoned in a circle, he effected 
a complete system o:f dogmatism. He made philosophy a system o:f 
laws, all of which have a purely logical foundation. Thus he 
becomes a rationalist of the radical type. He finds an indirect 
proof for the existence of the principle of sufficient reason 
1 
Sec. 905 Ontologia. 
2 
Ibid Section 901 
3 
Ibid Section 66 • Our translation. 
' 
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in the order and interaction of things, since they demand 
principles according to which each individual is determined 
in its place. These principles or norms are four, cognos-
cendi, fiendi, agendi, and essendi.1 
The first of these represents the relation of the premise 
to the conclusion; the second, the source of all possibility, 
the third and fourth,that through which the reality of a thing 
is recognized. Strictly speaking, Wolff makes each principle 
a cosnoscendi. A principle af.ways ex~sts before any effect is 
2 
possible, therefore, ornnj) causa :prior causa to • 
Logical necessity ,Wolff regards identical with reality 
and holds that by means of mere logical operations with con-
ceptions, it is possible to. learn something concerning the 
causal relation of things. The true criterion of a cause is 
3 
its logical character. 
Thus even more radically than Leibnitz, Wolff champions 
rationalism and proceeds to deduce"more geornetrico"an extensive 
ontology and metaphysics, and makes the formal laws of logic 
the basis of the causal idea. He leaves out of consideration 
in his deductions the empirical sciences, using them only to 
oonfirrn(as he thought~ his logical structures; unconscious 
of the fact that an agreement was to be found in the two 
only because " his a priori construction of mataphysical 
disciplines borrowed from experience step by step, though 
1 
Ontologia ,Sec. 866. 
2 
Ibid Sec 906 
3 Ibid Sec 951 
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the loan was unnoticed."1 
He also ignored the questL on : as to what pr inc i:Ple con-
nects the two elements, cause and effect, applying as did most 
of the philosophers of his time, the theory of pre-established 
harmony only to the relation of body and soul. 
Wolff's philosophy is of especial interest because of 
its subtlety and the fact that Kant at first adopted it, and 
then as the "Great Kant" reacted aga inst it. 
THE SENSATIONAI.ISTS. 
John Locke, the earliest representative of the sensation-
alistic school_, was a contemporary of Spinoza. He owed his 
philosophical awakening to the study of Descartes' writings. 
Descartes began his reasoning by doubting in a philosophical 
sense everything that could conceivably be doubted, and then 
examined whether any unassa ilable certainty was left him. 
He :found such a c ertainty in his own consciousness and accord-
2 ingly began his system with the principle," Cogito ergo sum." 
This postulate and others akin to it he called eternal truths 
or innate ideas. Locke was unable to agree with Descartes that 
there could be such ideas. He found himself unable to 
find the least trac4>f' them in the mind and asserted that 
even if such could be found, they could. not do anything for 
3 knowledge. ~his conclusion led him to examine the scop e 
and nature o:f human reason ; in fact, it gave impetus 
1 
History of Philo so ~Jh:_;r- Windelband-Page 482. 
Di scours de la Methode, III! --Descartes. 
3 
An Es say Concerning the Human Unde r standine · B ook 1, Ch.=p 2/ 
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to a whole century of research into man's inner life. After 
denying the existence of innate ideas, Locke frankly puts to 
himself the question~ Wl->..ence then do we get our knowledge? 
At the beginning of his second book he answers this question 
in a general way. We quote as follows," Let us then suppose the 
mind to be as we may say, white paper devoid of all characters, 
without any ideas; how comes it to be furnished? Whence comes 
it by that vast store which the busy and boundless fancy of 
man ha.s painted on it with almost endless variety? Whence bas 
it all the materials of :reason and knowledge? To this I are wer 
in one word, from experience; in THAT all our knowled.ge is 
founded and from it ultimately derives itself. Our observc:~ticm 
is employed either about external sensible objects or about 
internal operations of our minds, pe~ceived and reflected on 
by ourselves, is that which supplies to our understanding all 
the materials of thinking. ~hese two are the sources from whence 
1 
all the ideas we have or can have, naturally ,do spring." 
Locke' a theory of caueali ty grows directly out of 
the doctrine thus enunciated. Through our observ~tion of nature 
we get our ideas of cause and effect. Anything which produces 
any simple or complex idea we denote by the general name,cause; 
and that which is produced , effect .. Further," A cause is that 
which makes any other thing, either simple idea , substance, 
or mode begin to be; and an effect is that which hfid its begin-
1 
An Essay Concerning the Human Understa.ndi ng --:BOOk II Chap 1 
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1 
ning from some other thing." 
A cause may be either a creation, a generation, a making, 
or an alteration. When a thing is made wholly new, out o.f matter 
not before existing we call it creation. ~n a substance is 
produced in the ordinary course of nature by some internal 
principle which we cannot perceive, we call it generation. When 
a cause is external and the effect produced by a sensible sep-
aration or juxta-position of discernible parts, we designate it 
a making; and when any simple idea is produced which was not 
in that subject befQre, we call it alteration. 
In order that we may have ~l idea of cause and effect~ 
" it suffices to consider any simple idea or substance, as 
beginning to exist by the operation of some other , without 
. 2 knowing the manner of that operat~on. 11 
Thus the notion has its rise from ideas received by sensa-
tion or reflection. Locke does not analyze the idea of cause 
as thoroughly as Hume. He fails to touch upon the real problem 
of causality; namely) What is the principle by which the two 
elements, cause and effect are related1 
George Berkeley 
Berkeley agrees with Locke that all knowledge comes from 
the world of experience. In the "Common Place Book" we read: 
'Foolish in men to despise the senses. If it were not for them 
3 
the mind could have no kn,owledge, no thought at all." 
1 
Essay Concerning the Human Understanding - Book 3 Chap .26 
2 
Ibid.------Book II, Chapter 26, Par.2 
3 
Common Place Book-Fraser Edition,Vol.l Page 23. 
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He denies, however, that material substance exists. "It 
is evident~ he says," there is not any other substance tr~n 
Spirit. n 1 lfhe only wo1ld of sense-experience is the world 
of ideas. AbstrB.ct ideas do not exist. We think they exist 
because of the use of words as general terms, but in truth, 
even in connetion with such vrords, we always think the sensu-
ous idea, or its gr~ which at the beginning gave rise to .that 
term. Abstract ideas 11 abstract power ;:u·e all void of mea ning; 
the issue of unlawful analysis. ~he abstract cannot be thought 
alone. Always in such an attempt we come upon the sensuous idea, 
which constantly remains the sole content of the intellect. Even 
if it were possible to separate remembered and partial ideas, 
they would be found to have no content, but original sense-
impressions, bacause an idea can never copy anything else than 
another idea. We see only appearances not tb.e real quality 
2 
of things. 
In answer to the question: fS there then no reality 
outside our own fleeting ideas? Can we know nothing beyond 
the fact that these ideas come and go'? he answers, we certainly 
can. We know the necessity and coherence of our sense-experience 
lJ!oreover, we know ourselves and trJtt. t there must be some cause 
:for the ideas we have, which produces and changes them. Further, 
this cause cannot be a material substance, for only ideas 
exist. The cause of ideas must be an active incorporeal spirit. ) -
1 
A lfheory concerning Human Knowledge-Part 1 Far. 7. 
2 
Ibid.---- Pa±t 1 Sec. 87. 
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In his" Principle of the Human Understanding" we read:" It 
(cause) must therefore be a substance; but it has been ahovm 
that there is no material or corporeal substance: it remains 
therefore, that the cause of ideas is an incorporeal, actiYe 
1 
substance or spirit." 
Since we know that our wills are unequal to the task of 
creating ideas, we conclude that there must be some other will 
which produces ideas in us·, namely, God; for, 11 the ideas im-
printed on them ( the senses) ar e not creatures of my will. 
2 There is some other will or spirit which produces them. 11 
Concerning the manner in which the infinite becomes this 
source, Berkeley declares that God talks to us t~crough our 
senses. By this he means that it is through the laws of nature 
that we are led to ideas such as cause and effect. These laws, 
" teach us that such and such ideas are attended with such and 
3 
other ideas, in the ordinary course of things." 
BY observing that in nature a c e1.·tain effect follows a 
given cause we are brought to the conclusion that when one 
phenomenon appears another will shortly follow. The idea of 
law is thus made the basis of the principle of causation. 
Back of the law and back of the ideas it give rise to, is God. 
Berkeley's significance lies in the fact that he makes 
spirit the essence and. the cause of the universe, and posits 
the infinite as the source of our sensible impressions. He was 
1 
Principles of the Human Understanding -Fart -+, Sec.28 
2 3 
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the first to sharply distinguish and clearly formulate 
the doctrine of phenomenalism. 1 
David Hume 
Hume's most important contribution ,to philosophy is his 
speculation concerning causality. In his famous work,"A 
Treatise of Human Nature~ a full discussion of causality is 
given. 
The relation of cause and effect, he contends, cannot 
be perceived. 11 We have no other notion of cause and effect, 
but that of certain objects, which have always been conjoined 
together, and which in all past instances have been found in-
separable. We cannot penetrate into the reason of the conjunc-
2 tion." All the senses are cognizant of is the relation of 
objects in time, according to which one regularly follows 
the other. Thought, in interpreting this sequence into con-
sequence, does not find a basis for the causal idea in the 
content of ideas, for one cannot deduce logically the idea 
of effect from that of cause. The only explanation possible 
of the causal idea, is to be ~ained by means of the association 
of ideas, for " reason can never satisfy us that the existence 
of any one object does ever imply that of another; so that 
when we pass from the impression of one to the idea or belief 
of another, we are not determined by reason, but by custom 
1 
Entwickelung des Causalproblcms-- Koenig-Page 204. 
2 
Treatise of Human Nature-Part III, Sec.6 
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1 
or a principle of association." Because certain ideas and 
,-(...-
groups of ideas follow each other we are led to amagine and 
expect the second after the first. In time this expectation 
and imagination is interpreted as a real subjective necessity, 
as if the object corresponding to the first idea, forced that 
corresponding to the other to a real existence in :no.ture. 
According to Huce, causation contains three essent1al ele-
menta: contiguity, succession, m1d necessary connection. Concern-
ing the first two of these f~actors we can predicate the origin, 
but no impression can be found for the third. In his search for 
its origin, Hume asks two questions: (a) Whence then does the 
idea of cause orignate? (b) ~~Y do we conclude that a partie-
ular cause must necessarily have a particular effect? 
In answer to the first of these questions, he says,that 
the idea of cause cannot be reached a priori~ i.e. by merely 
analyzing relations between ideas. Whence then the idea? The 
senses cannot give origin to it) for they are limited to the 
present moment; neither can reasoning upon experience aid usj 
for reason can never show us the connection of one object with 
another, though aided by experience. Therefore, the principle 
must oome from the only remaining faculty, the imagination. 
" 'Tis this pr inci:ple which makes us reason from causes to ef-
fects; and 'tis the same principle which convinces us of 
2 
the continued existence of external objects." 
l 
A Treatise of Human Nature --Part III, Sec. 7. 
2 
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Causation is thus made merely a relation between ideas, 
having subjective existence only; resting upon the fictitious 
substitutions of impressions derived from reflection for those 
of sensation, without objective validity. " And how disappointed 
we must be, when •.ve learn, .that this connection, tie, or energy 
lies merely in ourselves, and is nothing but the determination 
of the mind, which is acquired by custom, and causes us to 
make a transition from an object to its usual attendant.n 1 
Since the form of causality, and the constitutive forms 
of conceptual knowl.edge of reality, ·are mere products of 
the mechanism of association; Hume asserts, they have no de-
monstrable rela tion to the real. And although universal judg-
ments go beyond experience we cannot say that they mediate 
valid knowledge. " We suppose , but are never able to prove, 
that there must be a resemblance betwixt these objects, of 
which we have ~~d experience, and those which lie beyond the 
2 
reach of our discovery." A priori judgments are impossible 
and non-existent, because the mind is determined by custom. 
The thorough-going nature of Hume's conclusions 
instituted a new epoch in philosophy. It inspired men like 
Reid and Hamilton to attempt to go back of his premises 
to correct the presuppositions which led to such sceptical 
doctrines, and helped set Kant on the track of a conception 
which revolutionized philosophy. 
1 
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THE RF.ACTION. 
In the above brief review we traced the growth of the 
idea of causation. We found a great division in the opinion 
of the rationalistic and sensationalistic schools concerning 
the nature and the validity of the idea. The former came to 
the conclusion that the real ground or causality of things 
is logical, and therefore deducible frou. abstract reason. The 
latter, on the other hand, contended that the causal idea is 
the result of custom, and a mere figment of the imagination. 
without objective validity. 
Confronted by these conflicting views Kant undertook 
to determine the truth. Prompted by Leibnitz he deliberated 
whether the theory of pre-established harmony might not 
solve the mystery of the relation of thought and being. After 
careful deliberation, he came to the conclusion that any 
theory of pre-established harmony is nothing but a metaphys-
ical assumption, incapable of proof and therefore unphilosoph-
ical. 
For a time he was a disciple of the Wolffian school 
but liberated himself from the influence of its naive realism 
which regarded necessity and reality, ~s identi<:al~ when he saw 
the impossibility of determining out of pure reason; ·i.e. 
through logical operations,anything concerning the nature 
1 
of causality. As early as 1763, in a paper entitled,"versuch 
1 
Cf., Kant's Sole Possible Proof for the Existence of God. 
IJ 
den Begriff der negativen qrosen in die Welt einzufuehren, 
he tobk a position in sharp contrast to the absolute relati-
vism of the old m~tap~sical school. In opposition to it , 
he contended,that the real ground or fundamental cause is 
never a logical ground and therefore, the relation of caus e 
and effect, cannot be deduced from abstract reason. 
In reacting from the sensationalistic doc~rines, Kant 
was led to give expression to the great trut.!1 that a priori 
ideas have objective validity in the world of experience. 
The representative of this school directly responsible 
for the development of this doctrine was David Hume, who 
declared that all knowledge comes from experience • The idea 
of causality, since its origin can neither be traced to the 
senses nor the reason , must come from the only remaining func-
tion ; namely, the imagination. 
1 Awakened from his dogmatic slumber by Hume's reasoning 
Kant saw · that the idea of cause cannot be derived from ex-
perience. Nevertheless, he decided, it must be more than a 
figment of the imagination. He concluded that the only way to 
settle truth and philosophy on a sure basis was to Undertake ~ 
profound investigation of the understanding to ascertain the 
origin and the validity of this idea. 
The result was the"Critique of Pure Reason"which seeks 
to determine the o'rigin, the number and the legitimate province 
1 
Preface to the Prolegomena. 
11 Dogmatism ist das dogmatische Verfahren der reinen 
Vernunft ohne vorangehende Kritik ihres eigenen ~ermoegens. 11 
' (Kritik S.34) 
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of the ideas of form and tho'l,lght not derived from experience, 
Sli.l!Ch as causality, space, time, eto. 
Thus Kant reacted from both the rationalistic and sensa-
tionalistic doctrines. He was unable to subscribe to their 
tenets because they failed to give a rational account of 
the relation of knowledge to its object, of its inherent 
property and its foundation~ 
this disagreement. 
His system was the outcome of 
KAUT' S PROBI,EMS. 
The rationalists and sensationalists were divided on 
the question: Do we possess a priori or rational knowledge 
objects? The former answered in the affirmative: D.Y means of 
pure thought we reach an absolute knowledge of things, which 
cannot be acquired through the senses. The latter de~the 
proposition: We gain a knowledge of objects through the senses, 
hence absolute knowledge is impossible. 
The rationalists contended that ideas.- such as causality, 
time, space, etc. have absolute validity and are deducible 
from pure reason. Hume concluded that all such ideas, especial-
ly that of causation, since they are not derived from experience 
are mere figments of the imagination and therefore without 
objective validity. 
Meditating concerning these contradictory 
1 
views Kant , 
Kant's letter to Marcus Herz, Feb. 21, 1772. 
65. 
hl_ 
decided that his predecessorsAfailed to agree because they had 
proceeded illogically. They had assumed that reason had cer-
tain capabilities and characteristics, but had neglected to 
examine whether these assumptions were true. He asserted, there-
fore, tl~t he would examine the postulates of reason, to arrive 
if possible at an understanding of the truth. 
It was the aim of Kant's investigation to determine 
whether a priori knowledge exists. If so, what is its value? Has 
it objective validity? In w~~t does tl1is knowledge consist 
and upon what does it rest? How can principles of a priori 
knowledge , such as causation, space, time, etc. which are not 
derived from experience and are not logical deductions, possess 
the validity and the value of objective knowledge2 
Kant agreed in part with each of the opposing theories 
and combined these parts into a new theory. In reference to 
the Leibnitz- Wolffian system, he makes the statement: Although 
ideas, such as causality, etc. can be deduced from pure reason 
they have validity in the phenomenal world, only, and not in 
the noumenal. In opposition to Hume's empiricism he asserts: 
Causality and like ideas, are not mere figments of the imagin-
ation; they are a priori forms,with objective validity. In hie 
""~ Jl Kritik, he seeks to substantiate these claims. 
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A Prtori Knowledge Described. 
Kant's first step is to describe a priori knowledge. He 
distinguishes between two kinds of knowledge, a posteriori 
and a priori. The forme r is that which is taken from exper-
ience. It never really gives us any general truths. The latter 
transcends all experience, and is incapable of being proved 
by any experience. It presents us with general truths, which 
bear the character of an inward necessity, and are clear and 
certain by themselves. Thus, even if we remove from experience 
everything that belongs to the senses, · there remain 
certain original concepts which are innate to the understand-
ing. BY means of these concepts we are able to predicate more 
concerning the objects of our senses than experience can 
teach us. Through them we attribute to our propositions a 
real generality, a strict necessity, such as mere empirical 
knowledge can never supply. A priori representations leave the 
field of all possi.ble experience by means of concepts to 
which experience can never supply any corresponding objects. 
In this sphere of knowledge, which transcends all experience, 
reason prosecut~s its investigations. 
A distinction must be made between a priori and pure 
a priori judgments. It is often the case that we designate 
as a priori, experiential knowledge; where-as, in reality 
such knowledge is derived from a general rule deduced from 
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experience • Thus we say; for example, concernir1g a certain man 
who undermined the foundation of his house, that he should 
have known a priori that it would fall; i.e., he might have 
known this would happen without waiting for experience to dem-
onst1:ate it. 
Kant calls such knowledge a priori, since it is grounded 
in experience. Such representations which transcend all exper-
ience and have no empirical elements, he designates pure. 
There are certain marks or characteristics whereby 
a priori knowledge may be known. If we find a proposition 
whi.ch presents an inward necessity we designate it a priori. 
Further, if it is derived from no other proposition~ except, 
perhaps, one which also has an inward necessity, it is a pri-
ori. Experience gives comparative or hypothetical universality o~~ 
to its judgments, never true or strict universality. If now 
a judgment is thought as strictly universal;that is, so that 
no exception is imagined in any way possible';'..,.  i't must not have 
been derived from experience, and is valid a priori. The prop-
osition: All bodies are heavy, is a priori, because it expresses 
a strictly universal truth. 
Necessity and strict universality are the certain 
marks of knowledge a priori. The two belong together and must 
not be separated • . Wherever and whenever these criteria are 
found a priori origin is proclaimed. 
68. 
A PRIORI JUDGMENTS EXIST AS PRINCIPLES IN 
-----------------------~-------------------
ALL THEORETICAJJ SCIENCES. 
The basis of Kant's criticism is the fact of the actual 
presence of a priori judgments in the three theoretical sci-
ences : mathematics, pure natural science and metaphysics. 
That mathematical judgments are pure a priori judgments 
is patent, since they have a universality and strict necessity 
which cannot be derived from experience. So also, the pure 
natural sciences contain synthetic a priori judgments. For 
example, in the judgment that in all changes in the objective 
world the qu~ntity of material remains the same, we leave the 
·world of experience , and add the a priori conception identity 
and necessity. Further, in the metaphysical ~ealm , a priori 
judgments exist. This is evident when we stop to consider 
that here we leave the world of experience absolutely, and 
make assertions which have nothing but a priori origin. In 
the statementt The world must have a beginning, we have an 
illustration of such procedure. 
SPACE AND Titffi AHE P~~CEPTIONS 
A PRIORI 
Having stated briefly that a priori judgments are present 
in the theoretical sciences, Kant examines their claims 
to universal and necessary validity. The sciences of all 
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the principles of sensibility a priori, he designates trans-
cendental aesthetic. 
In the course of his investigation , Kant shows that 
the general ideas,space and time}towhich all insight of 
geometry and arithmetic relate, ~e principles of pure a priori 
knowledge. 
SPACE. 
Usually we represent to our selves objects as external 
or outside ourselves, and in space. It is within this, that 
their form • size~and relative positions are fixed and deter-
mined. !Ut is this procedure tenable? Has spaoe objeotive 
vali dity suoh as Common Sense conceives it to have2 Or is it 
a determination and relation inherent in the forms of tuition 
only? 
Space is not an empirical concept which has been derived 
from external experience, for before we can refer our sensa-
tiona to something outside ourselves, and represent them as 
,.r 
side by side, the ~tuitions of space must already be present. 
Therefore, external phenomena do not give orign to the con-
i\ 
cept of spaoe, but space intuitions make external axperienoe 
possibie. 
+f the intuition of space were a concept a posteriori, 
borrowed from general wxperience, the first ~rinciples of 
mathematical dwtinition would be oxposed to all tha ~ccidcnts 
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of n~rception; and since they would only be somthing taught 
in each case by experience, they would have no necessity. 
~1 inductions !rom experiancd ar~ re~~tivo 1 Wld thoreforo we 
shou~d not oe ao~e to say more than that as far as our present 
~xperience is concerned, certain mathematical truths are true. 
Space forms the very foundation of all external intuitions. 
" Der Raum iat eine nothwendige Vorstellung a priori, die allen 
1 
Anschauungen zum Grunde liegt." We cannot imagine that there 
should be no space, though we might be able to imagine space 
without objects to fill it. Therefore, space must be regarded 
as a condition of the possibility of phenomena. It is a pure 
intuition, for it is not made up of several parts. It is a 
unity, that is, we find but one space. Such a thing as indi-
vidual apace, differing from another individual space~we do 
not discover. If apace~uitions were derived from experience 
such a unity and homogeneity would be impossible. 
Space is represented as infinite in quantity. Experience 
could not give us this idea. There must be infinity in the 
progression of intuition, else the concept could not exist. 
The fact that apace is a constant form, invariable and 
indispensable to all experience, !(ant contends, is evidence 
that it is nothing but the form of all phenomene . of the 
external senses. It is a subjective condition of our sensibil-
ity, necessary to ' the existence of all external representa-
tions, a priori in the understanding, and contains prior 
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to all experience, principles regulating the relations of 
objects • . Tnm. 
~ime is not an empirical concept deduced from experience, 
for both co-existence and succession would be impossible if the 
representation of time were not given a priori. 13Y means . of 
this a priori representation, it is possible for us to imagine 
that things happen simultaneously or at different times. 
Time is a necessary representation on which all intuitions 
depend. " Die Zeit is eine notwendige Vorstellung, die allen 
Anschauungen zu Grunde liegt.•-----Die Zeit is also a priori 
1 gegeben." . We can take phenomena out of time, but we cannot 
take time away from phenomena. ~herefore, since time itself 
cannot be done away with, though all phenomena may vanish, it 
is given a priori. 
Time has one dimension only. It is simultaneous. Different 
times are nof simultaneous but successive. Experience could 
never impart such universality nor apodictic certainty. Differ-
ent times are only parts of one and the same time. When we 
speak of more than one time, we mean parts, only, of one and 
the same time. 
When we say that time is infinite, we mean that every 
. 
definte quantity of time is possible only, by limitations of 
" 
one time • which f'or·ma the basis of all things. Its original 
1 
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representation must therefore be given as unlimited. An unlim-
ited representation, however, cannot be given by ooncepts,but 
must be founded on immediate intuitions. 
~ime is not something existing by itselt, neither is it 
a determination peculiar to external phenomena, for it refers 
neither to their shape, nor their position, etc.~ it only deter-
mines the relation of representations in our internal state. 
Time, thereofre, is simply a subjective condition of our intu-
itions. Apart from the human mind,it is nothing. 
CRITICISM OF KANT'S DOCTRINE 
OF SPACE AHD TIME. 
Kant has substantiated his contention that the general 
ideas of space and time are perceptions a priori. Our cEiti-
cism has to do only with his theory tha.t these forms are 
purel~ subjective in character. Hie doctrine concerning a pri-
ori ideas is round, but in his application of it he exaggerates 
its jurisdiction. 
He commonly makes our space and time intuitions arbitrary 
forms without any determining factor in the causal world. The 
mind is represented as standing waiting to impose its space 
and time forms upon reality without regard, whatsoever, for 
the nature or circumstances of the warne. Moreover, he postulates 
the understanding as arbitrarily related to things, with the 
l 
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result that his theory of perception is vitiated in the 
attempt to bring the mental forms into use. For notwithstand-
ing Kant's dictum of the arbitrariness of the relation of the 
mind to things, its mental forms are compatible with the most 
varied applications. This is evidenced by the :fact that the 
mind itself does not determine whether a given object shall 
appear as a cube or some other figure. In Kant we find nothing 
which supplies a principle of discrimination or makes a choice 
between various forms possible. 
74. 
CAUSATION AN A PRIORI PRINCI~LE. 
Causality like space and time is an a priori principle. But 
while space and time are pure a priori forms,causality is so 
only in part, since before we can have an idea of particu¥}ar 
causal relations, an external representation ia necessary. Upon 
this the understanding basis its knowledge. " Ich werde also 
-- in unserem Fall die subjective Folge der apprehensionen von 
~ 
der objectiven Folge der ErscheinungenAmuessen, weil jene 
- sonst gaenzlich unbestimmt is, und keine Erscheinung von der 
anderen unterscheidet." 1 :Sy this series of representations 
the understanding is bound. ~his determined order cannot be 
varied or inverted in any manner. Fo:t- instance; if in 
a phenomenon we call the antecedent state of perception A, 
and the subsequent B,B can only follo"w A in our a pprehension, 
wl1ile the perception A can never follow B, but can only precede 
it. We see a ship gliding down a stream. ~t is impossible in 
the apprehension of this phenomenon, that the ship should 
first be perceived below, and then higher up .. We are forced to 
conclude that the order in the succession of our apprehension 
is here determined, and our apprehension is regulated by that 
order. It is evident that we shall have to derive the sub-
jective succession in our apprehension from the objective sue-
cession of the phenomena, because otherwise, the former would 
be entirely undetermined and unable to distinguish one phenom-
1 
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enon from another. 
But while the understanding receives its knowledge of 
particular effects from experience, the causal law itself is 
purely an a priori principle. Its formula is: Every thing pre-
supposes somthing upon which it follows according to rule. 
This law is inherent in the understanding. "Das Naturgesetz, 
das alles, was geschieht , eine Ur~ache habe) dass die Cau-
salitaet dieser Ursache, d.i. die F~ndlung, da sie in der Zeit 
,4)-
vorhergeht, ~d in Betracht einer Wirkung, die da entstanden, 
1\ 
selbst nicht gevvesen sein kann sondern geschehen sein muss,--
dieses Gesetz, durch welches Erscheinungen allererst eine Natur 
ausmachen und Gegenstande einer Erfahrung abgeben koennen , 
ist ein Verstandes 4esetz, von welchem es unter keinem Vorwan-
de erlaubt is, abzuweichen!'1 From this law no phenomenon 
is exempted, for a phenomenon is never isolated~ it has a 
necessary connection in the order of nature. We think of each 
as necessarily following or preceding another appearance, and 
refer it to the members of this series. That each effect has a 
cause, we know, for a reality following upon an empty time 
we cannot imagine. Empirically, we cannot observe this • . 
The understanding posits such a cause by virtue of a law, in-
herent in itself. This causal law is a purely transcendental 
principle, since it contains nothing derived from experience. 
1 
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Besides, its objects cannot be determined in any experi~e, 
because it is a general rule and the possibility of all exper-
ience that everything that happens has a cause, and that the 
causality also of that cause, whioh itself has happened or 
arisen, must again have a oause. Among phenomenal causes there 
is nothing which can originate the idea of a series, or even 
give a hint of one, and since the understanding desires to 
arrive at an absolute totality of the condition in causal 
relation, reason creates tor itself the idea of suoh a begin-
ning, without an antecedent determining it to action. The 
principle of causation is an a priori form to such an extent; 
that reason sometimes presupposes, that , although something 
has not happened in a given case, it ought to have happened; 
even though a determining foroe exists among phenomena, 
which seeks to influence it to the contrary. 
CAUSALITY, SPACE AND TIME ARE 
---------- ~~~----~~~~~~-~----~-
SYNTHETICAL CO.GNITIOUS. 
In order that we may understand Kant's statement that the 
a priori principles space, time, and causality are the result · 
of tpe .synthetic action of the understanding, it is necessary 
to examine his doctrine of experience. Experience is neither 
given ready-made from without, nor is it altogether due to 
the action of the understanding. It is the result 
of a union of these two factors . the . objective 
I 
I 
r 
I 
I 
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world and the active understanding .. The latter by virtue of its 
own powers reacts upon impressions given from without, and sup-
plies the necessary factors of rational experience. This activity 
proceeds according to definite constitutional aptitudes or 
norms. The constitution of the understanding is not evolved out 
of experience, but exists as it were, with intrinsic a priori 
forms, and imposes them upon the data of the objective world 
making experience possible. 
Considered from a temporal point of view, these a priori forme 
are coeval with experience; logically speaking, they may be said 
to be prior, since they form its condition. These forms,although 
they belong to the understanding and are inherent in it, cannot 
by themselves deduce a system of reality; a representation from 
without is a necessary complement. 11 So ist Erfa.hrung nur durch 
1 
einer notwendigen Verknuepfung der W&hrnehmungen moeglich." 
At the same time the understanding is active in the very effort 
of gathering data. 
While on the one hand, the forms of the mind are empty with-
out the data of the senses; on the other, objects can gain no in-
telligible presentation without the a priori forms of thought 
and intuitions inherent in the mind. n Der Verstand vermag nichts 
anzuschauen, und die Sinne nichts zu denken. Nur daraus, dass sie 
sich vereinigen, kann Erkenntniss entspringen. Eeide Vermoegen 
~ 
oder Faehigkei ten koennen auch ihre Functionen nioht vertauschen!' 
Thus Kant's doctrine of experience consists of 
two factors: the activity of the understand-
ing and objective presentation from without. 
1 2 
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ll'his activity of the understanding is a synthesis. It is 
the act of arranging different representations togethe:c and 
of comprehending what is manifold in them under one form of 
knowledge. Experience would be impossible were it not for 
certain necessary forms of relationships between the elements 
of which it is constituted. If we are to have intelligent ex-
perience at all, it must be coherent. Sense life is the .basis 
of this thought lilfre. We do not produce this life of sense 
absolutely, nor do we find it in any way possible to modify 
its laws, for it is purely a mental product; that is, an elemen-
tary reaction of our sensibility against external action. These 
reactions are not the products of thought, they are the result 
of the structure of our sensibility. In the simplest judgment 
of sense we find a unique synthesis of thought. Apart from 
thought, such sensations are simply peculiar affections of the 
sensibility. They go flitting through the mind and produce 
only a mental blurr, unless the mind fixes the dissolving 
flux into a single and abiding meaning. Only· thus can exter _ 
nal representations become objects of experience. 
That coherent experience is possible only through 
a synthetic act ion of the understanding is clear '.Vhen we re-
membe~'that an impression lasts through a certain moment of 
time and no longer. The earlier parts are different than the 
later. Time, itself, therefore as occurring, is not one but 
an independent manifold and l eft to itself, wouibd never become 
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one, . for it has no unity. 
The impression itself, is also an indefinite manifold 
just as time, for the impression as occurring in the earlier 
parte of the time is not the impression occurring in the later. 
Each impression vanishes as soon as it is born and since time 
may be divided indefinitely, the impression becomes indefinite-
ly many. The impression has no unity of itself. It acquires 
this only through an act of thought, which constitutes it one. 
The impressions as occurring are a continuous flux. Thought, 
by its synthesizing action transforms them into a fixed idea. 
If it were not for this implicit logical activity, not even the 
simplest sensation could have any significance for intelligence. 
Experience involves a very complex activity and is possible 
only for an intelligence which has transformed its particular 
representations into general conceptions of abiding significance. 
The understanding by its synthesizing process, makes possible 
necessary intellectual judgments, without which experience 
is impossible. 
Even after the understanding has recognized the groups 
of f'J..eeting sensations, and has made them stand for objects 
which are identical and permanent, it must connect them reciproc~ 
ly with one another as members of~ common and unified world.The 
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past and future must have some intelligible and necessary 
relation, since they are a. part of a single experience, in 
every point of which we find ourselves equally present. 
Causality is :the . t.ool which~he self uses to unify its exper-
ience. It is the expressed unity of life and an absolute law 
because only such elements of reality concern us as will fit 
the mold of our intellectual nature. Causality is one of the 
necessary categories of thou~1t, and every time one looks 
to find the ex:p lana tion of something that has happened, or 
attempts to connects two things together, one makes use 
of this relation which is a form of synthesis. 
Space and time like causality are due to the synthetic 
action of the understanding. This synthesis is pure, since 
the manifold is not given empirically but a priori. " Eine 
solche Synthesis ist rein, wenn das Uannigfaltige nicht 
empirisch, sondern a priori gegeben ist wie das im Raum 
und der Zeit." 1 
THE A PRIOUI IDEAS SPACE, TD.lli,AUD CAUSALITY 
----------------------------------------HAVE YAT~IDITY IN THE PHillNOMENAL WOP.LD OlTI:.Y. 
------------------- -------------------
We now consider the questions: What validity have the 
a priori forms space, time, and causality, which constitute 
the framework of the understanding? Does their use pertain to 
objects of the senses, or to things-in-themselves;i.e. the 
noumenal world? Does the world created by the understanding 
I . / A _J {) ·-L I ~~ chA._ ~ v~~ ---f.~Q.. {0 'J-
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by means of these forms, find a complement in reality? 
Kant maintains that the understanding can never make 
any but an empirical use of its pr inciplea a priori. A transcen-
dental use is impossible. The former refers to phenomena only, 
tl~t is to objects of possible experience; the latter , to 
things- in- themselves. That an empirical use alone is admis-
sible is evident from a . consideration of the requirements of 
concepts. First, a concept requires a logical form; and secondly, 
an object to which it refers. Let an object be lacking, and the 
concept had no sense, since it is empty and devoid of all con-
tent. An object can be given to a concept only in intuition. 
But pure intuition, although it is possible a priori, can re-
ceive its object only by an empirical intuition of which it, 
itself, is nothing but the :tb rm. All a priori concepts and 
principles refer to empirical inttliti ons, i.e. to data of 
possible experience. Without this reference,they can claim 
no objective validity. An examination of the concepts of math-
ematics makes this clear. 
Even though such a principle as space has three dimensions, 
and may be produced in the mind a priori, it would have no 
meaning, if we could not represent this abstract concept sensu-
ously; that is, if we could not show that its corresponding 
object exists. A general sensuous condition must underlie all 
possible experience. DY means of the pure concepts 
R?. 
o~ the understanding and certain determinations of their 
schemata, objects are distinguished. These categories, for 
such Kant designates the forms of the understanding, are 
nothing but representations of tl1ings in general, so far as 
the manifold in intuition must be thought by one or the other 
of these functions. " Die reine Categorien sind aber nichts 
~ders als Vorstellungen der Dinge ueberhaupt, so fern das 
Uannigfaltige ihrer Ansc~ung duroh eine oder andere dieser 
logischen Functionen gedacht werden ~s.n1 
These a priori concepts have an essentially synthetic 
or constructive function. They subject the sensory elements 
to the conditions of time and space before they are presented 
to the understanding as data. Moreover, they arrange the various 
phenomena of experience in a system of logical sequence and 
co-existence by means of a central force, causation. According 
to these forms all knowledge is organized and determined. Further~ 
the quality of the knowledge which the mind can assimilate is 
determined in connection with the forms of time and space and 
the principle of causality. Independently of the external world 
no experience is possible. On the other hand, no experience 
can become an object of knowledge to the understanding unless 
it :t'ul.fills the requirements of the space, time .. and causation . 
categories. These categories are laws inherent in the under-
standing. To their structure all possible objects of cognition 
must conform. The world of experience is constituted 
by means of data which have been subjected to the conditions 
1 
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of space and time, and sustain an orderly and coherent rela-
tion to one another through the central force, causality. It 
is not nature Y.rhioh imposes its necessity upon us, but we who 
give laws to nature. In other words, the understanding by pre-
scribing laws to nature creates its own world. a'his world is 
the only one we can know. It gains a right to exist only by 
subjecting itself to the norms imposed by the understanding. 
In short, it is Kant's position that the very nature 
of the understanding makes it necessary tl~t the sensory mater-
', 
ial which forms its data ba passed through a process of transm~-
tation, imposed by the nature of thought, before it can be-
come a form of cognition. This necessity it is which causes the 
real nature of things to be hidden from us, for the mind by 
this process, instead of presenting to us things as they are, 
transmutes them according to its own nature and the determin-
_ations{or its own peculiar constitution , and masks things-fn-
themselves. BY virtue of its very nature, which transforms 
all data before we become cognizant of them , th~ · mind fails to 
give us a true knowledge of reality. 
This result logically follows, because all the phenom-
ena of experience are mind-conditioned. The ultimate ground, 
before it can appear in consciousness at all, must become 
and object of knowledge; . that is, it must take on a form 
foreign to itself, so as to comply with the space and time 
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necessities and the causal laws which are imposed by the mind 
as the inevitable conditions of experience. Whatever t!1ese phe-
nomena may be in themselves , they must all conform to the con-
ditione imposed by the understanding, and lose thereby·, for us, 
the true attributes of reality. 
In answer to the question: Have a priori ideas, such as 
space, time, and causality a transcendental u~e, that is, do 
they apply in the noumenal worldl Kant replies that they have 
an empirical use only~ that is, in the world of sense objects 
'because they are simply f~rms of the understanding to which 
I'eality must subject itself before it can become an object 
of experience. " Hieraus flieszt unwidersprechlich: dass die 
reinen Verstandesbegriffe niemals von ti·anscendentalcm, sondern 
j ederzei t nor von empiriscr:.em Gebrauche sein loennen, und dass 
die Grundsa.etze des reinen Verstand ef-j nur in :seziehung au.f die 
all gemeinen Bedingung einer motLichen Rrfahrung der Sinne, nie-
muls aber auf' !linge Ueberhaupt ( ohne Ruechtsicht auf di e Art 
zu ne:b.men wi e wir sie anschauen moegen) bezogen werden ko ennen"1 
Examining in grea.t er detail Kant's speculations concern-
ing the causal idea to ascertain whether he refers it to objects 
of the senses or to things- in - themselves, we find that he maked..-
it pertain entirely to the former. 
He distinguishes with reference to events, two kinds of 
causalj_ty 1 causality either of natur e or o:f fr eedom. The former 
1 
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is the connection of one state in the world of sense with 
a preceding state, on which it follows according to a rule 
of the understanding :. cthat that which happens or arises re-
quires a cause. This law has application only to the data 
of the senses since these alone can become objects of experience. 
By freedom in its cosmological sense, Kant under-
stands the beginning of a state spontaneously. Ita causality 
does not depend upon another cause. It is a purely transcendental 
idea, which in the first place contains nothing derived fran 
experience; and secondly, has for its content objects which 
cannot be determined in any experience. Since it is impoeeible 
to arrive in any way at an abeolute totality of conditione 
in causal relatione, the reason creates for itself the idea 
of epontaneity, or the power of beginning by iteelf without an 
external cauee the law of causal connection. This predispo-
sition of reason has no application in the noumenal world • 
' 
• 
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CRITICISM OF KANT'S DOCTRI1TE OF PHENOMENALISM. 
---------------~-------~~------------------~--
This doctrine follows logically fr .. om Kant's theory of re la-
tivity, which affirms that the laws of the understanding have 
validity only in the world of experience~and restrict human 
knowledge to phenomenal appearances which mask the noumena 
behind them. 
This position is amenable to criticism. Ey its very state-
ment , this doctrine makes an assumption which is contradictory. 
It posits the reality of things, but doubts if we can know them, 
and postulates the existence of things- in -themselves and then 
maintains that they lie beyond the range of cognition. 
If things-in-themselves lie beyond the range of cognition, 
what right has reason to affirm their existence? Things exter-
nal to all thought are unknowable, and therefo.re unaffirmable. 
Any denial based upon the subjectivity of the laws of 
thought is self-destructive. If no law of thought is allowed 
to be valid for things, then things-in-themselves become 
not only unaffirmable but meaningless and empty of all content. 
The following process of reasoning makes this evident! If 
all the categories are subjective to us, then the independent 
reality is neither one nor many, for unity and _plurality are 
categories and have existence only through them. Reality is then 
neither a thing in itself nor things-in-themselves,neither cause 'YW\.. 
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effect for all these are also categories which form the 
framework of the world of experience. Reality thus appears 
without any of the attributes of reality, and is therefore 
but an abstract conception and objectively nothing. 
This doctrine assumes that appearances or phenomena exist 
and then sets up reason as a judge, which is made to pronounce 
r the former unreal and kno·wable, and the latter real and"knowable. 
Such reasoning is illogical, for if reason has the power to 
judge thus, it must be granted the ability to know something 
concerning things-in-themselves; else how could it pronounce 
them real in contrast to phenomena or appe~rances! 
Kant's theory of relativity is an attempt to conceive 
substance without properties and oomes face to face with all 
the objections pure being finds arrayed against itself~ the 
essence of which isj that since an object can be known only 
through ita attributes, any attempt to posit things without 
properties involves a logical impossibility. 
In the next place this doctrine declares that we can know 
phenomena or appearances but not the noumena back of them. It 
is difficult to see how it is possible for appearances to 
exist without advertising the reality behind them; for if 
behind phenomena there were nothing as their reality, the 
phenomena would be all, and in knowing these we should know all 
- - - - ~~ 
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[ there is to know. It is hard to say in what sense a phenom-1 enon can be such, unless it really advertises the thing. A 
manifestation in which nothing 'is manifested, or an appear-
ance in which nothing appears, is to say the least, a bizarre 
notion. In that case it would simply be an event in an individual 
consciousness, which pointed indeed to an external cause , but 
revealed no existing fact. 
The question as to oo·w the mincl gets a knowledge of appear-
ances if it is not mediated to it by reality, also militates 
against phenomenalism>for it woULd hardly do to say that the 
mind invents it, for then we should not be able to distinguish 
phenomena from other creatures of the imagination. In addition, 
the assumption that there is a faculty in man which criticises 
his reason and pronounces its necessary ideas unreal,testifies to 
the weakness of the theory. 
This theory is tantamount to the statement that knowledge 
is unreal since it is relative to the faculties of the mind. 
Such an assertion is guilty of predicating that knowledge 
is impossible because there is a mind that knows. 
Finally, this doctrine is untenable because it dis-
credits and con.tradicts consciousness; gives noumena a position 
which is not a necessary idea of the understanding and discredits 
I 
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reason, the supreme faculty of man, and condemns him to 
universal agnosticism without warrant. 
And after all, Kant himself gives us very cogent grounds 
for the acceptance of the objective validity of the cate-
gories, by positing man as a moral agent and assuming that 
the arrangement of the universe corresp onds to the demands 
of the moral personality. By a parity of reasoning, why not 
assume the universe to be related . , so as to corresv ond to 
the rational demands of manta intelligence? 
A FIRST CAUSE POSITED BY PURE REASOU 
THROUGH IDEAS. 
Thus far we have considered the existence and a ppli-
cation of such judgments of experience as space, time, and 
causality. Experience, we have seen, is never able to give us 
an unconditional cause. On this account,rea son is forced to 
look for something different from all phenomena·, that is ,for 
an intelligent object in which there should be no more contin-
gency. Since we have to deal with things which are not meant 
to be objects of experience we shall have to derive our knowl-
edge of them from what is necessary in itself. Hence we must 
begin our investigation with the Idea of an absolutely necessary 
being. This conclusion of an .infinite series must be thought 
if the understanding is to reach the conception of totality. 
Such mental representations of the unconditioned, 
le I I 
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Kant designates Ideas. In order to understand the meaning of 
this term it is necessary to. examine Kant's gradJl,ated list 
of representations. 
The whole class of concepts he calls representations. 
Under this he places: first, conscious representations, per-
ceptions. A perception referring to the subject only, is a 
sensation; an objective sensation is knowledge, cognition. 
Cognition is either intuition or concept. The former refers 
directly to an object and is singular;the latter, refers to 
it indirectly, by means of a character is tic corr.mon to several 
things. A concept is either empirical or pure. The pure concept, 
in so far as it has its em· igin in the understanding only, is 
called, notion (notio). A concept formed of notions and transcend 
ing all possible experience, is an Idea, or a concept of reason. 
Ideas must necessarily be thought, but can never become objects 
of knowledge. They are still further removed from objective 
reality than the categories, because they can never meet with 
phenomena in which they could be represented in concreto.l 
Kant points out that although Plato's Idea, in common with 
hin use of the term, is used to~ express concepts that 
transcend all experience, it has an altogether different sig-
nificance. Plato uses the term to mean something which not only 
was never borrowed from the senses, but which even far transcends 
the concepts of the understanding. With him, Ideas are arche-
1 
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types of things themselves. They flow out f:ro rn the highest 
reason and from thence receive forms cognizable by the human 
understanding. 
Through Ideas, as defined by Kant, reason aims at sys-
tematic completeness and unity; a unity which is greater than 
any to which empirical knowledge might attain. They are not 
constitutive principles through whioh,as the categories, 
objects of experience are produced.)but merely regulative prin-
ci~les, by which the understanding is constrained to seek 
for farther and farther connecting links in the realm of 
experience. 
Reason proceeds in accordance with these ~dea~ 
and forms conceptions of a thinking subject, a soul, and a 
Supreme Being, as the ground of all secondary conditions 
of existence. They demonstate nothing, and can prove nothing 
objectively; for all proof, all certain knowledge and science 
is grounded on experience. All attempts to prove,by the ar-
guments usually drawn from reason and pure metaphysics, the 
personality of the soul, the creation or non-eternity of the 
universe, and the existence of God are futile and worthless. 
This is evidenced by a consideration of the arguments advanced 
by pure reason for the existence of God. 
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. ARGUllENTS DRAWU FROM SPECUALTIVE RF.ASON FOR 
----------------------------------------THE F~ISTENCE OF GOD ARE FUTILE AND WORTHLESS. 
---------------------------- --------- -----
According to Kant there are three and only three proofs ad-
vanced by speculative reason for the existence of God. They are 
derived,either from definite experience and the peculiar nature 
of the world of sense known to us through experience and ascend-
ing from it to the highest cause existing outside of the world; 
or they rest on indefinite eJ~erience; that is , on any existence 
that is empirically given; OJ: finally, they leave experience out 
of all account and conclude a priori that a supreme cause exists. 
The first of these proofs>he designates, the physico-theological; 
the second, the cosmological; the third, the ontological. It 
is his purpose to show that neither by means of the one nor 
the other of these proofs ca:n. reason achieve anything. 
The ontological proof concludes the existence of a supreme 
being, from the Idea of God. Kant demonstrates that the con-
cept of an absolutely necessary being is merely an Idea, whose 
objective validity is by no means proved by the fact that reason 
requires it. The absolute necessity of a judgment is only 
a conditional necessity of the thing. This pure logical 
necess:iity it is, that has led people to the idea.)that they 
can conclude from it with certainty~that the being whose ex-
istence is implied in the concept must itself be absolutely 
necessary. Such an argument has no more 
value than the following reasoning of a poor man: 
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I have the idea of a hundred thalers, hence these hundred 
thalers exist - in my purse. 
The cosmological argument assumes that there can be no 
infinite series of causes and effects without a first cause. 
It reads as follows: If it is possible for a thing to exist, 
then a necessary being must exist as its cause. Now I, at least, 
exist. Therefore, an unconditioned, necessary cause must exist. 
This argument is called cosmological since it is based upon 
the "cosmos" of experience. By connecting the series of contin-
gent things with a first and necessary cause, reason imagines 
that the series is closed. As a matter of fact, such is not the 
case. Between the world as a finite thing and the first cause 
as an infinite being, there exists a yawning clmsm which sep-
arates the necessary from the contingent, the relative and 
the finite from the infinite. The proof is inconclusive because 
it does not explain how a transition from one of these . factors 
to the other is possible. 
The teleological or physico-logical proof infers from 
the finality revealed in nature, the existence of an intelli-
gent creator. Its principal points are four: (1) We find every-
where in the world evidences of order and an intelligent adapta-
tion of means to an end. Every detail in nature is worked out 
with great wisdom. (2) This order and adapatation of means to an 
end cannot be due to things themselves, that is , neither nature 
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itself spontaneously, nor by a combination of forces, could 
have arranged things in such an intelligent manner. This could 
only have been done by a rational, disposing principle accord-
ing to certain fundamental ideas. (3) There must exist there-
...r 
fore, a great, sublime, all-p~erful cause(or causes) which must 
~ve produced the world, not only as an omnipotent nature acting 
blindly but as an intelligence. (4) It is possible to infer the 
unity of this cause from the unity of the reciprocal relation 
of the parts of the world• as portions of a well-built edifice. 
We know this is true as far as our experience goes. According 
to the principle of analogy we have grounds for thinking it 
is true beyond experience. 
Although this argument makes a deep impression upon 
the mind , and is a good v;eapon in the hands of the preacher, 
Kant declares it has no value from a scientific point of 
view~ for ( 1) It passes from sensible data to some thing that 
does not fall within the scope of reason. Here we meet an 
hiatus, such as we found in the cosmological argument. (2} Even 
if the proof were considered valid in itself, it would only 
demonstrate that there is an architect, but not a creator of 
the world.(3) This argument allows us to infer only a propor-
tionate cause, that is, a cause which is itself relative and 
imperfect because it rests upon the imperfect, contingent and 
:> 
limited things of experience. Even if we grant the validity of 
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the argument, it can prove only the existence of a very power-
ful cause, and it is only by changing imperceptibly the argtt-
ment that we infer a cause that has the attributes all-wise, 
all-powerful and all-skilful. By leaping suddenly from the 
realm of experience into the region of possibilities)the championA-
of this argument reach their goal. w Denn wenn sie nur selbst 
pruefen wollten, so wuerden . wir finden, das, nachdem sie eine 
gute Strecke auf dem Boden der }Tatur und Erfahrung fortgegangen 
sind, und sich ~leichwohl immer noch eben so weit von dem Ge-
genstande finden, der ihrer entgegen scheint, sie ploetzlich 
diesen Boden verlassen, und in's Teich blosser Moeglichkeit 
1 
uebergehen." 
'T'his proof is based upon the .cosmological, and the cosmo-
logical on the ontological proof for the existence of God. The 
latter is inconclusive; consequently, all arguments based upon 
it are futile. 
The Antinomies. 
-----··; · --~.: -- ................ _,_ 
To substantiate his contention furtherJthat all the 
arguments drawn from pure reason and metaphysics to prove the 
personality of the soul, the creation of the universe and the 
existence of God, are worthless and futile, Kant shows that 
the op;Josi te can be proved from the same source. Such a 
conflict is possible because Ideas are presented which 
are meant too agree, as a synthesis according to the rules 
1 
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of the understanding, and at the same time as an absolute syn-
thesis, with reason. A contradiction here at once arises, for 
if an idea is adequate to the unity of reason, it is too great 
for the understanding~ or vice versa, if adequate to the under-
standing they are too small for the reason. On the one hand 
reason demands a completion of the series of phenomena, on 
t he other, tl-e understanding demands an endless continuance 
of the same. Therefore, when assertions are made concerning the 
universe, hopeless contradictions and antinomies arise as is 
illustrated below: 
(a) Thesis - The world has a beginning in time, and is 
limited also with regard to space. 
(b) Antithesis - The world has no beginning and no 
limits in space, but is infinite in respect to time and space. 
(c) Thesis - Every compound substance in the world con-
sists of simple parts, and nothing exists anywhere but the sim-
ple, or what is composed of it. 
(d) Antithesis - No compound thing in the world con-
eists of simple parts, and there exists nowhere in the world 
anything simple. 
(e) Thesis - There are in the world causes acting through 
freedom. 
(f) Antithesis - There is no freedom, but everything in 
the world takes place entirely according to the laws of nature. 
9? 
(g) Thesis There exists an absolutely necessary being, 
belonging to the world, either as a part or as a cause of it. 
(h) Antithesis -- There nowhere exists an absolutely necessary 
being, either within or without the world, as the cause o:r it. 
CRITICI'-SM OF Tim Al~TIUOMIES. 
Kant's antinomies exist onlJfwhen the universe is divided 
into phenomenal and noumenal worlds, a world which we can 
know and a world which we cannot know. The very fact that 
these antinomies arise is evidence of the weakness of !Cant's 
system. 
All four of these antinomies may be overcome by the same 
method; namely, by showing that the contradictions enumerated 
are such, only, when a distinction is made between the known 
world of appearances and an unknown noumenal world; but they 
vanish utterly when oonsidered with reference to a unified 
spiritualistic universe, a universe not entirely unknown,and 
forming a harmonious whole. 
In case of tl1e first two antinomies, if it is remembered 
that the the sis in each case refers to the empirical or" seen" 
world, while the antithesis applies to the ontological world , 
we encounter :no further dif:ficul ty. 
So also, if we recollect that space and time as well as 
the causal series are only forms of intuitions which the mind 
crecJ,tes through its synthetic action our perpiiexi ty vanishes, 
• 
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for then it is evident that they cannot be said to be either 
finite or infinite in character, with reference to their extent • 
If space and time are considered as existing apart from thought, 
the dilemma as to whe tl~r they are to be thought finite or 
infinite as regards their extent cannot be avoided. 
In the case of the third and fourth antinomies the same 
solution in general is apDlicable, although the application is 
different. These propositions present two seemingly different 
and contradictory theses which are in fact bQ,th true when 
correctly apprehended, and present no difficulty or contradiction. 
It is patent that things in the "seen" or empirical world may 
be subject to limitations, but at the same time there may be 
complete freedom and liberty in the world-ground itself. The 
effects we see are the results of the actions of the prime causal 
ground. In nature, as viewed by us, all things appear contingent, 
yet underneath there is a free dynamic agent or being. Freedom 
and natural law are in no wise incompatible. Vlliat is known to 
us as natural law is but the mode and manner in which the 
world-ground acts. 
The • -:antinomies, although they have again and again 
proved stumbling blocks to the student of philosop~; are, it 
seems to us , not worthy of tile importance usually accorded to 
them. They are inexplicable only when Kant's distinction between~ 
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known world of appearance and an unknown noumenal world are 
posited. Otherwise no difficulty presents itself. The antinomies 
are the outgrowth of an artificial and forced system. 
PRACTICAI .. BEASON FURlUSHES A CERTAIN GROUND 
---------------------- IIIU -------- ~- , ---- .... --- ,__ --.... -
FOH Tlffi EXI~WE OF GOD, THE -sm.rt , AliD nmORTAI .. ITY. 
--------------------------------- --- - --- --- - ---- ~- - -
Kant has demonstrated that pure reason cannot prove the 
existence of God, the soul, and immortality. Would he have us 
believe that these things have no reality, no existence, no 
certainty to us? Are we to be left a prey to scepticism? No, 
we are not left without any ground of certainty as to the reality 
and objective existence of things. It is true that pure reason 
does not furnish such a basis, but it is found in practical 
reason- in our moral nature. In consciousness we find as firm 
and sure a basis for knowledge of the existence of the soul and 
of God, as for the knowledge of our own existence. Here we find 
an attestation to the reality and existence of our moral nature, 
and a revelation of the supremacy within us of an absolute 
moral law, imperative and commanding - the authority of con-
science. This law implies freedom,{ without which all moral 
action is impossible ) , a future state, and a God who is 
author, lawgiver and judge. 
Hence,we are justified in saying that the existence 
of God and the soul are rGa.lities and truths which though 
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not founded in theoretical reason, have certain ground in 
practical reason, in the moral nature of manJattested to by 
consciousness, whose testimony cannot be impeached .. 
RECAPITUJ.~ATION .. 
In our presentation of Kant's analysis of the problem 
of causality we found ouraelves forced. to consider a number of 
philosophical principles and questions, and one reading this 
dissertation might be inclined to criticise this procedure, 
since it was our avowed purpose and aim to consider the prob-
lem of causality and not the broader field of philosophy. 
It must not be forgotten that ~ant considered his analysis 
of causality anything only because it grew out of the applica-
tion of certain broad and general principles which for him 
underlay experience .. We quote Koenig," Indess weis mann, dass 
Kant einen Fortschritt seiner Auffassung des Causalproblems 
gerade darin sah, dass er dasselbe in einem allgemeinen Zusam-
menhang brachte, und die Aufloesung Desselben als ei.mie specielle 
Anwendung gewisser allgemeiner Principien betrachtet wissen 
1 
wol1te .. 11 These princi.p les form the basis of Kant's analysis and 
had to be examined by us, in order that his position might be 
understood .. Moreover, without an understanding of the prin-
ciples upon which experience is based, causality cannot be under-
stood, even in part, for it is the warp and woof of experience. 
1 
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We present an epitome of Kant's theories which have 
vital connection with his analysis of the problem of causality. 
In this summary we state briefly the questions which confronted 
I f 
Kant, and follow them with a resume of hi a answers. 
(1} The first problem which confronted him was; How 
can the contention of the rationalists that concepts such as 
causality, time, and space have absolute validity in the objec-
tive world be refuted? How can it be demonstrated that these 
concepts are not deducible from pure reason? 
Kant answers this by showing that no experience is poe-
sible without -a conjunction of external representations and 
the activity of the understandng. The former furnish the data , 
and the latter transmutes them into experience. Neither of these 
factors alone could mediate knowledge. 
(2) Is Hume's position tenable;that since the principle 
of causation is not derived from experience, it is a figment 
of the imagination and without validity? 
Kant decided that Hurne was right as to this premise. 
He sm·,r,however, that causation is not the only principle not 
derived from experience. The same is true with a large part of 
our ideas. These cannot be rejected as untrustworthy, and of 
no authority on that account. They are necessary in order that 
we may have experience, whatever their origin or nature; and 
must be admitted and established as of the highest authori t;y·. 
I 
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(3) How must we proceed to accomplish this? 
A profound investigation of reason is necessary to de-
termine the order, the number and legitimate province of the 
ideas of form and thought, such as causality, space, time etc. 
(4' What are a priori ideas? 
A priori ideas are universal and necessary principles 
of the understanding, which transcend all experience, and are 
not capable of baing proved by any experi.enc e. 
(5) Does a priori knowledge exist? 
Such knowledge exists as~prinoiple in the theoretical 
sciences, mathematics, pure natural science and metaphysics. 
(6} What are some of these a priori principles. 
Space and time to which all insight of geometry and 
arithmetic relate are examples of such principles. In our crit-
icism we pointed out that space and time perceptions are not 
without a determining factor in the external world. 
Causation is also an a priori principle. As a law of 
the understanding, it transcends all experience. 
(7~ ·What is the nature of the principle of causation? 
causality is a synthetical cognition and helps the self 
to uniry its experience. It is the expressed unity of life. 
(8) What validity have the a priori pr~nciples space, 
time~and causality? 
They have validity only in the phenomenal world • They 
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are the forms which the understanding imposes upon ~eality, 
in order that it may become an object of experience. The world 
thus created we can know, because it gains a right to exist 
only because it subjects itself to the norms of the understand-
ing. ~he noumenal world remains unknown because it loses its 
identity in this process. 
In reference to this doctrine, known as phenomenalism, 
we pointed out~ {1) If the noumenal world is unknowable it is 
unaffirmable;· (2) Appearances to be such must mediate knowledge 
of some sort. 
(9) Since experience can never give us knowledge of the 
first cause, what is .the origin of the idea? 
Reason constantly aims at systematic completeness and 
unity, a unity greater than any to which empirical knowledge 
can attain. It does this by means of Ideas. Ideas are mental 
representations of the unconditioned. They have subjective 
value only and can prove nothing objectively. 
(10~ What status then have the arguments drawn from pure 
reason for the existence of God? 
Kant shows that the cosmological, ontological and phys-
ico- theological proofs for the existence of God are inconclusive 
because reason makes certain baseless assumptions and proceeds 
illogically. It imagines that by connecting the series of con-
tingent causes with a first and necessary cause the series is 
closed• and makes unwarranted leaps from the realm of experience 
I 
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into the region of possibilities. 
To fur ·ther substantiate his contention that all argu-
ments drawn from reason and pure metaphysicsJto prove the ex-
istence of God,are worthless and futile; Kant shows that the 
opposite can be proved with equal cogency. 
In our criticism of the antinomies, we showed that the 
contradictions they involve are the outgrowth of a forced and 
artificial systen which posits a known phenomenal, and an 
unknown noumenal world. 
(11) Are we then to be left a prey to scepticism? Would 
Kant have us believe that God, the soul,and immortality have 
no reality? 
The answer is,no. The exi Bt~nce in consciousness of 
a moral law, imperative and commanding; implies the existence 
of the soul, immortality,and a God . which is its author. These 
trutlls,though not founded in theoretical,have a certain ground 
in practical reason. 
(12) Finally, then, what answer does Kant give to the 
ep istemological and metaphysical problems philosophy suggests 
concerning causation? 
Epistemologically speaking, Kant points out the reality 
of experience and knowledge and answers the questions,How is 
experience possible, by showing that both mind activity and the 
data of the external world are necessary. These external repre-
sentations are impressions which the mind transmutes into a 
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world of experience. ~is world is the creation of the under-
standing and therefore is knowable. The principle of causation 
has its application here, since it is a law of the mind. concern-
ing its status in the noumenal world we are ignorant, because 
of the limitations of the categories of the understanding .. 
GENERAL REMARKS. 
Kant's first effort is one of ruthless negation. He 
forces us to give up many of our favorite beliefs .. In fact, 
his was indeed a Copernician revolution. ·· He dealt, 
as he had planned, a death-blow to materialism, atheism, pan-
theism~and kindred doctrines .. In his Kritik of Pure Reason 
we read," Durch diese ( Kritik) kann nun allein dem Materialism, 
Fatalism, Atheism, dem freigeistrischen pnglauben, der Schwaerm-
erie und Aberglauben, die allgernein schaedlich werden koennten, 
zuletzt auch dem Idealism und Scepticism --------- selbst die 
1. 
Wurzel abgeschnitten werden .. " 
At the same time Kant took away that confidence which 
had for years been the happy lot of theism. He contended: that 
it was impossible to kno,., anthing concerning the nature of the 
ultimate cause .. Theists disputing this, asserted that there is 
a great difference between knowing nothing and knowing something 
concerning the world-ground. Such an observation is worthy of 
serious thought, for it is hardly probable that the understand~~ 
1 
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deals with representations which are the .creations of a causal 
force, and yet remains in entire i~orance concerning the nature 
of this agent. Thus far Kant's work has been destructive. 
Now for his constructive side. He shifted truth and 
reality from object to subject, from the world to the soul. 
This one fact is enough to place Kant among the great philos-
ophers of the world. Of course the subject itself is a problem 
and a difficult one. For instance, it may be asked, where does 
this subject receive its powers, its synthesizing aptitude,and 
its norms? What is it and whither is its existence? 
Kant,through his analysis has done much to set the 
principle of _causation in a clearer light. He has given thinkers 
impetus in the right direction. I{as the twentieth century been 
able to add much or improve upon the analysis of this problem? 
Uany false hypotheses have been demolished by the philosophers 
of this century, and many truths have been gleaned; these give 
ground for the hope that at no far distant day, truths concerning 
' the ultimate cause will be discovered, which today lie hidden. 
----------0-------~-
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